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Quand je dis donc que tout visible est invisible, que la perception
est imperception, que la conscience a unpunctum caecum, que voir
c’est toujours voir plus qu’on ne voit, ... il faut comprendre que
c’est la 	

qui comporte une non-	)
Merleau-Ponty, Notes de travail, “Visible-	” Mai 1960
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ZENO’S FOUR PARADOXES
AGAINST MOTION
Hideya YAMAKAWA＊
THE FOUR PROVISIONAL EPISODES2)
1 ACHILLES AND HIS SHADOW3)
Achilles rushed
Like a wind on the plain of Scamander,
Achilles dashed
A thousand fold more quickly than the sun
Which was moving westward
From high overhead.
Far away, in the distance,
He saw a small, yes very tiny appearance
Of Trojan stronghold and
Of the glittering top of a tower
Reflecting sublimely
The light of the burning sun.
Now, you must wreak revenge upon that fellow
Hector who killed your beloved Patroclus.
Hurry, now, Achilles
Show him your matchless power,
You “light-footed”
Achilles!
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Achilles rushed
Like a whirlwind on the blue meadow.
Achilles dashed
With his back to the setting sun,
And in front of him
Treading on his black shadow.
And the Shadow guided you, Achilles!
Like an anonymous clown or Cartesian daemon
Dancing and jumping,
Stretching and shortening his figure
Amorphously
On the dark green meadow-canvas.
2 DEATH OF THE SHADOW4)
There was a man who was afraid of his own shadow and his footprints. He was
a deathly pale person who covered his whole body with a black hood and black
cloak. And he was himself a shadow-like person. He believed that he might not
always be followed by his own shadow if he himself was a ghostly fellow.
However his shadow and his footprints have tenaciously stayed close to him,
appearing from somewhere unexpected whenever he went out. And each time
they appeared he ran for his life, screaming with fear, in order to separate him-
self from them. But, with weird stretching and shrivelling, the shadow always
crawled and wiggled there on the earth, sometimes in front of him, sometimes
behind him.
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Hoping to outstrip and detach himself from the fellow, the man put his best
foot foremost. But he could neither overtake nor run away from that fellow,
however hard he might try to pursue or escape. The more he ran, the greater
became the number of his footprints, and his fear grew all the more. Thus, the
man ran even harder.
Running and covered with sweat, he stupidly thought “my running is not
enough.” Thus the man continued his desperate running incessantly and finally
he expired by the roadside. There on the earth remained only the black hood
and cloak, and the faintest of shadows.
3 THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE SHADOW AND ITS SHADOW5)
The shadow of the shadow complained against the shadow,
“Hey, you fellow, there is no-one as inconstant as you. A little while ago you
were standing, and now you are sitting. For me this is unendurable as I must
always move as you move. What an unprincipled chap you are! Be consistent!”
Responding to this the shadow said,
“I am at a loss when hearing such an irrational complaint, since, you know, not
only you, hey, but also I myself must move as my master moves. However the
master himself is in the same situation because my master is somewhat, you
know, a puppet of a puppeteer.”
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4 IMMOVABLE SPEAR6)
One pursuing and the other being pursued three times
Achilles and Hector ran about the castle wall of Ilion. And
At last for the fourth time when they came near to the fountain,
The two heroes confronted each other.
With his back to the sun Achilles
Threw his spear at Hector who protected himself with a buckler.
And the bronze spear which departed from Achilles’ hand
Flew straight and fast.
In reality however it did not fly in the slightest.
In the space between the two heroes
Casting its black straight shadow on the burning field of Ilion
In midair it stood immovable.
II ZENO’S FOUR PARADOXES
Le visible est pregnant de l’invisible.7)
Merleau-Ponty, Notes de travail, Novembre 1959
1 ZENO OF ELEA
Once in the milieu of the ancient Magna Graecia, there lived a Greek called
Zeno. He was a native of Elea, the Phocaean colony founded in the sixth cen-
tury BC,8) situated on the south-west coast of Italian peninsula.9)
Zeno was a disciple of Parmenides the founder of Eleatic school10) and he
himself was a renowned philosopher; his nickname was “Eleatic Palamedes.”11)
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Though it appears that he had a few opportunity to visit Athens and give lec-
tures to the public figures like Pericles and Callias son of Calliades,12) yet he
was primarily an enthusiastic patriot and so ‘despised the great no less than
Heraclitus’ that he preferred to spend a large part of his life in his native Elea
to staying at Athens.13)
Aristotle called Zeno “the inventor of dialectic.”14) He was a philosopher es-
pecially gifted with dialectical reasoning and wrote possibly a book including
the famous four arguments against motion.15) But he was not only a philoso-
pher but also a politician.16) Like almost all Presocratics, he too committed to
the political affairs. A number of stories inform us of his rebellion against a ty-
rant and of his heroic end under the terrible torture.17)
By the way, the arguments produced by him too, it appears, have the notes
of such a rebellious or a retaliatory spirit. Plato in the Parmenides makes Zeno
confess the true purpose of his book as follows:
The book is in fact a sort of defence of Parmenides’ argument against
those who try to make fun of it by showing that his supposition, that there
is a One, leads to many absurdities and contradictions. This book, then, is
a retort against those who assert a plurality. It pays them back in their
own coin with something to spare, and aims at showing that, on a through
examination, their own supposition that there is a plurality leads even
more absurd consequences than the hypothesis of the One.18)
The setting of the dialogue Parmenides, which assumes the meeting in
Athens of three famous persons, Parmenides, Zeno, and young Socrates, may
be a fiction. But, as almost all Plato scholars agree, we have no positive reason
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to doubt what Plato says about the contents and purpose of Zeno’s book.
2 ZENO’S PARADOXES
Zeno retorted against persons who ridiculed his teacher Parmenides. His
argument was so sharp and powerful that it was difficult to resist his power of
persuasion. Yet the matter did not affect that his conclusion was very perplex-
ing and strange. In particular his argument against motion appeared to be quite
illogical and senseless. He declared outrageously: “An object in motion is not
in motion.”
Being confronted with such an apparently absurd conclusion from common-
sensical viewpoint,19) everyone raised loudly their objections all in one voice:
“Why?”, “Warum?”, “Pourquoi?” Thus for a long period from the fifth century
B.C. to our contemporary time, the noisy booing and disputations against
Zeno’s arguments have broken out and indeed lasted to be so until now our
present day. Indeed, the “Zeno’s paradox” became a pronoun of a long-
standing and unsolvable problem. Thus each and every sort of heads were, ir-
respective of the age or gender, irrespective of their shape and colour, and of
course irrespective of their hair-style and a quantity of hair, lost in their
thought and inflamed with the notorious “paradoxes,” which Zeno of Elea
skilfully produced 2,500 years ago.
Everyone knows somehow of Zeno’s paradox. You must possibly remember
the “Achilles and Tortoise:” It declares that even Achilles the hero and the
swiftest runner in the Trojan War, can by no means overtake the tortoise
which goes on all fours ahead very slowly. Some of you are surely to be re-
minded of your former classroom scene when you were still boys and girls; or
of your teacher’s or of your friend’s feverish chattering about the paradox; of
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an irritating riddle under your nose. Then, with your tongue-clicking, you
might have given a vexatious groan: “Devil takes it!” And at last becoming
very serious you might have scribbled on your desk some clumsy illustrations
of the two competing figures of Achilles and tortoise as well as many jumbled
lines or calculation numbers with your stubby pencil!
So famous is Zeno’s paradox, though of course there is no testimony about
a fact that Zeno himself or his contemporaries called Zeno’s argument against
motion “paradox.” It was indeed in later ages that Zeno’s discourses in the
lump came to be called “paradoxes.” The fact discloses implicitly the posteri-
ty’s way of evaluation of Zeno’s personality as well as of his discourse.
The “paradox” in English is derived from a Greek adjective “”
(paradoxos) which was originally compounded from a Greek proposition
“” (para) (the pronoun in this case means “contrary to,” “anti” etc.) and
a noun “	” (doxa) (the noun in this case means “opinion,” “judgement”
etc.) and customarily used among the public to mean for example the cases
such as “a statement which seems to be foolish, anti-commonsensical or im-
possible,” “an improbable combination of the opposing qualities, ideas, etc.,”
“a statement, idea, or fact that is combination of the opposing qualities, ideas,
etc.,” and “a statement, idea, or fact that is opposite or contrary to what is gen-
erally or commonsensically believed to be true or to be just.”20)
The “paradox” is generally in our everyday life regarded as a kind of “fun”
at best. But it appears that the “paradox” bears something more serious than
“fun.” It puts somehow on itself a more critical or negative nuance; in other
words it has a slanting posture and an indication of the immediate counterat-
tack against a serious treatment, which can in its extreme case torment one so
as to cause his death.21) So, it may be considered that a “paradox” is nothing
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but a false charge to a just thesis; that is to say, it is analogous to a negative
picture against a positive one, i.e., a mere shadow against the original. Thus,
they might say that if there is no established doctrine there is no room for a
paradox too; therefore, a paradox remains to be a negative proposition in the
long run, whose fallacious roots should be rightly disclosed by a commonsen-
sical deliberation.
Thus they concluded that there is something wrong in the “paradox;” in
other words some non-obvious flaws or some camouflaged facts, since a “par-
adox” eventually means that ‘an apparently unacceptable conclusion derived by
apparently acceptable reasoning from apparently acceptable premises.’22)
3 ZENO AS A SOPHIST
So people thought about the case of Zeno’s paradoxes too. They regarded
Zeno’s paradoxes as just skilfully constructed tricks or a kind of sophisms at
the most. In short, people have scornfully regarded Zeno himself as a sophist,
whose identity was a mere trickster of words and a plain “double-tongued per-
son (	
).”23) However, it is a noteworthy fact that the
judgement by B. Russell was different from this. Deploring the lack of critical
eye of the posterity, he said in his Principles of Mathematics as follows:
In this capricious world, nothing is more capricious than posthumous
fame. One of the most notable victims of posterity’s lack of judgement is
the Eleatic Zeno. Having invented four arguments, all immeasurably sub-
tle and profound, the grossness of the subsequent philosophers pro-
nounced him to be a mere ingenious juggler, and his arguments to be one
and all sophisms.
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According to Russell’s judgement, Zeno of Elea was not a mere “juggler”
but a genuine philosopher who pioneered a new and bold approach for the
future research into the notoriously difficult problems of “infinity” and “con-
tinuity.”
Setting aside at the present whether or not Russell’s judgement is proper,
in this volume I want to take up Zeno’s four arguments in question, i.e., the
Dichotomy, the Achilles, the Arrow, and the Stadium from another point of view
afresh and show a fundamental significance of Zeno’s paradox.
4 VISIBLE AND INVISIBLE
Notifying beforehand my intention in this volume, I would like to convey
here some of my true motive. I have no intention to deal with Zeno’s discourse
qua “puzzle.” And much less I intend to issue some new and unexplored
“solutions” of Zeno’s discourses qua “puzzles,” which might contrive the intri-
cate mathematical devices and which could be appreciated only by a small cir-
cle of specialists. My original intention in this volume lies in showing a fact
that something “invisible” is hidden behind the “visible” surface of Zeno’s dis-
courses. Zeno’s “paradoxes” as “visible” strata are in reality pregnant of the
“invisible” meaning, by which Zeno’s real intention can be disclosed. The
meaning is “invisible,” but the “invisible” meaning in question is not separated
from its “visible” layer. The “visible” thing itself assumes the meaning of the
“invisible.” Thus, the “invisible” is a secret counterpart of the “visible.”24)
I said just a moment ago that I have no intention to deal with Zeno’s dis-
courses qua puzzles. Yet, the subject-matter he called into question and indeed
Zeno himself hide behind the “visible” surface qua “puzzle.” Therefore, in
order to excavate Zeno’s “invisible” figure and bring it to light successfully, we
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must remove a large quantity of surface soil which covers Zeno’s true identity.
Thus breaking through the bulky layers of “paradoxes,” we have, by all means,
to get to the solid rock of Zeno’s thought.
I shall begin my task immediately and after digging up a great deal of earth,
I hope I could show you a fact that Eleatic philosopher’s keen insight, indeed,
penetrated fully into a rock bed of human intelligence.
5 ARISTOTLE’S REPORTS ON ZENO’S PARADOXES
It is regrettable however that there is none of Zeno’s own genuine four dis-
courses on motion left, which Russell praised as being “all immeasurably sub-
tle and profound.” It is true that there are some other genuine fragments of
Zeno. But, they are scanty and meagre. To investigate the four arguments in
question, we have no other means of relying on Aristotle’s valuable but indi-
rect information, especially on his report of Zeno’s arguments in the Physics
Z 9, 239b5240a18. Besides, there is another disappointing fact. Aristotle was
not always so friendly to Zeno. It appears that he had a rather bit hostile feel-
ing against Zeno. Whenever he refers to Zeno’s arguments, as I see it, he had
an underlying motive to bring forth a counterargument to Zeno. Therefore, we
might not place so much our hope on Aristotle’s unbiased view of Zeno’s dis-
courses. In spite of this discouraging circumstance, however, we must always
keep a stark fact that without relying on Aristotle’s report, there is no way to
grope for the hidden dimension of Zeno’s thought. So, in the first place, at any
cost, we must check closely Aristotle’s words in Phys. Z 9 one by one.
Aristotle at Physics Z 9, 239b9 begins his report of Zeno’s discourses with
the following impressive words:
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‘There are four arguments about motion of Zeno which give trouble to
those who try to solve the problem they involve.’25)
And he goes on to enumerate Zeno’s four arguments against motion one
after another. His report is so extremely compressed that the explanation is
hard all the more for its elliptical method of expression.
Let us leave a detailed study of Aristotle’s argument. Here in this introduc-
tory Chapter it is sufficed to pass en eye over the text and grasp the main point
in which each argument’s paradoxical-ness consist. In the following, I quote all
the text of four arguments in translation, distributing Greek texts themselves
for the critical reference into the column of footnotes. In giving a headline to
each argument, for the convenience, following the established practice I use
the term “paradox.” Thus, I call Zeno’s first argument against motion “The
first paradox” and so on.
6 THE FIRST PARADOX: THE DICHOTOMY (239b1113)
‘The first says that an object in motion is not in motion, because a thing
in motion must reach the half-way point before it gets to the end. This we
have discussed above.26) Hence Zeno’s argument makes a false assump-
tion when it asserts that it is impossible to traverse an infinite number of
positions or to make an infinite number of contacts one by one in a finite
time. For there are two senses in which length and time and, generally,
any continuum are called infinite, namely either in respect of divisibility
or of extension. So while it is impossible to make an infinite number of
contacts in a finite time where the infinite is a quantitative infinite, yet it
is possible where the infinite is an infinite in respect of division; for the
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time itself is also infinite in this respect. And so we find that it is possible
to traverse an infinite number of positions in a time of in this sense infi-
nite, not finite; and to make an infinite number of contacts because its mo-
ments are in this sense infinite, not finite.’27)
Pay attention to a fact that the text runs as follows: ‘A thing in motion (
		) is not in motion (
	), because () ...’ The sentence
structure itself exhibits a plain contradiction. In order to derive this contradic-
tion the subordinate clause beginning with ‘’ (because) is introduced.
Postponing a full interpretation of its implication, for the present, it is oppor-
tune to imagine a runner who is on the track in a stadium, since Aristotle at
the Topics 160b89 refers to this argument of Zeno as one purporting the
impossibility of traversing the “stadium.”28) The case suggests us an important
fact. Zeno’s Dichotomy was originally an argument which started from making
an appeal to our imagination.
7 THE SECOND PARADOX: THE ACHILLES (239b1518)
‘The second is the so-called “Achilles.” This is that the slowest runner29)
will never be overtaken in its course by the swiftest, since the pursuer
must first reach the point from which the pursued started, and so the
slowest must always be ahead.’30)
The paradoxical-ness of this argument consists in the following: ‘The slow-
est (runner) will never be overtaken ...by the swiftest.’ You may consider the
Achilles is not so paradoxical as the Dichotomy, which appeared to straightfor-
wardly violate the principle of contradiction. In reality however it is as
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paradoxical as Chuang-tzu the Taoist philosopher’s following words are para-
doxical: ‘Nothing in the world is bigger than the tip of an autumn hair and
Mount T’ai is small.’31)
Aristotle calls this argument simply “the so-called Achilles” and treats it as
essentially the same as the Dichotomy:
This argument is essentially the same as that depending on dichotomy,
but differs in that the successively given lengths are not divided into
halves. The conclusion of the argument is that the slower runner32) is not
overtaken, but it proceeds on the same lines as the dichotomy argument,
since in both, being divided the distance in a given way, it is concluded
that the goal is not reached: only in the Achilles a dramatic effect is pro-
duced by saying that not even the swiftest will be successful in its pursuit
of the slowest and so the solution of it must be the same.33)
Aristotle refers to the “dramatic effect (	
)” of this argument.
But, it does not especially so appear, because we cannot detect a concerned
party of the race.
On this topic I will try to give an explanation later.
8 THE THIRD PARADOX: THE ARROW I (239b57)
‘Zeno argues fallaciously. For if, he says, everything is either at rest or in
motion, but nothing is in motion when it occupies a place equal to itself,
and what is in motion is always in a given now occupies a place equal to
itself, then the arrow in motion is not in motion. But this is false; since
time is not composed of a number of indivisible now any more than any
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other magnitude is composed of indivisibles.’34)
9 THE THIRD PARADOX: THE ARROW II (239b3033)
‘The third is that just given above, that the arrow in motion is at rest.
This conclusion follows from the assumption that time is composed of a
number of now; for if this is not granted the conclusion cannot be
inferred.’35)
Zeno argues that a flying arrow does not fly. This is also a vivid and really
astounding stunt. By the way, Aristotle refers to this twice. This is the reason
why I distinguished the Arrow I from the Arrow II.
The Arrow I is brought forward by Aristotle in the opening of the chapter 9
with a sharp toned utterance that ‘Zeno argues fallaciously’ (	
	
	),36) whereas the Arrow II is assigned to the third position (“the
third” (
)) in relation to the other arguments against motion.
In both cases, however, Aristotle calls Zeno’s use of “now” () into
question; in the Arrow I “a number of ‘indivisible’ now,” and in the Arrow II
“a number of now” without a definitive “indivisible.” Namely, Aristotle in
Arrow I insists: ‘This is false; since time is not composed of a number of
indivisible’ (		
	

		
) and in Arrow II: ‘This conclusion follows from the assumption that
time is composed of a number of now.’( 		
		 !

"	). In any case Aristotle here sees the cardinal
point at issue in the concept of “now” ().
Zeno in the third paradox says: ‘The arrow which is in motion is not in
motion.’ This is also a plain contradiction. The absurdity of the Arrow’s
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conclusion is in a close match with one of the Dichotomy’s.
10 THE FOURTH PARADOX: THE STADIUM (239b33240a18)
‘The fourth is the argument about the equal bodies moving from opposite
directions alongside the equal bodies in the stadium the ones from the
end of the stadium, the others from the middle with equal speeds. In this
setting, he thinks, it follows that half the time is equal to its double. The
fallacy lies in the assumption that a body moving at an equal speed takes
equal time in passing a body in motion and a body of the same size at rest.
This is false. For example, let the bodies of equal size which are station-
ary be AA; let BB be those starting from the middle point of the As,37)
being equal in number and in magnitude to As; and let CC be those start-
ing from the goal, being equal in number and magnitude to As, and moving
at equal speed with the Bs. Then it follows that the first B and the first
C are at the end at the same time, as they are moving past one another.
And it follows that the firstC has passed all the Bs
38) whereas the
firstB
39) half; so that the time is half, for each takes an equal time in
passing each body. And it follows that at the same time the first B has
passed all the Cs. For the first B and the first C will be simultaneously at
opposite ends of As, [being an equal time alongside each of the Bs as
alongside each of the As, as he says,]40) since both take an equal time
passing the As. That is the argument, and it rests on the above-mentioned
falsity.’41)
As you see, Aristotle’s report of this paradox is very lengthy and intricate;
it is not only intricate but also obscure; in addition, the readings of the
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transmitted Greek texts themselves are so manifold that the interpretations
too are rather diverse. Here in this introductive part of my explanation, except
for the following illustration of the Stadium it is suffice to tentatively follow the
traditional reading of Lee in the Zeno of Elea in which he consulted to Simpli
cius’ authoritative interpretation.
The scene again is set in a “stadium.” Zeno in this argument also seems to
be at pains to give a vivid representation. Alongside the one stationary even-
numbered42) bodies A1A2 whose central axis (M) exactly corresponds to the
middle-point of the stadium, the other two sets of bodies (B1B2 and C1C2) equal
in number and size to the stationary one (A1A2) begin to move with equal
speeds towards the opposite direction at the same time.
In the following figure 1 let S be the starting line and G be the goal in the
stadium; and let it be that the A1A2 is a train of bodies which consists of two
parts A1 and A2 in equal size one another and the axis (M) runs through be-
tween A1 and A2. Then, let B1B2 and C1C2 be other trains each of which consists
of two bodies in equal size to each of two parts of the train A1A2 respectively.
Now let it be that both of the trains B1B2 and C1C2 are at rest and the right end
of B2 is on the M and the left end of C1 is on the M (Fig. 1). Now, let us sup-
pose the next scene in which both of the trains B1B2 and C1C2 begin to move
towards the opposite direction at equal speed simultaneously (at t1) and after
a given time (at t2) they shifted their initial positions to the next ones where
all the three rows A1A2, B1B2 and C1C2 were opposite each other (Fig. 2).
Then, it is obvious that the body B2 has passed one A (namely the body
A2) which is equal to B2, while the body C1 which is equal to the body B2
(=1A) has passed two Bs [namely the body B1 (1A) and the body B2 (1A)].
Based on this setting, Aristotle insists that Zeno concluded that one A is equal
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to two A (namely 1A =2A), therefore also that ‘half the time is equal to its
double.’
Is this argument, if it were Zeno’s original one, acceptable? Someone surely
does not think so and abruptly may speak once for all: ‘This is not even a para-
dox! Only a sophism! Nowadays no one is so foolish enough to accept such a
stupid talk!’ According to N. Booth, Zeno made a banal mistake and the
Stadium is a blunder due to his ignorance of the relative motion: ‘Zeno was
perhaps the first to bring theorising about time and motion into the Stadium.
This in itself was a great achievement; it is not to be wondered at if Zeno, in
first introducing this kind of theorising, made what appears to us to be an ele-
mentary blunder about relative motion.’43) However, in sharp contrast to this
disappointing evaluation, M. Schofield regarded Zeno’s conclusion as a “satis-
fying puzzle.” He said as follows: ‘Aristotle’s own version of the argument
yields a more satisfying puzzle than he allows. Baldly stated, the assumption
he attributes to Zeno does look like a banal mistake. But in order to force us
to the conclusion ... Zeno needs only to get us to accept the plausible idea that
if a body moves past n bodies of size m, it moves a distance of mn units; simple
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arithmetic will then show that moving mn units will take half the time of mov-
ing 2mn units at the same speed. Nor is this idea about the measurement of
movement easily abandoned in favor of a relative theory. For if the distance a
body moves is simply a function of its positions relative to other bodies, is
there any absolute basis for ascribing movement to it at all?’44)
11 ZENO AND THE CHALLENGERS TO THE PARADOXES
Though not sufficiently delineated, the above mentioned will do much for
the introduction into Zeno’s four paradoxes. Now, I would like to start my
work of digging up the layers of Zeno’s paradox immediately. But, from where
and how should we get on work? Leaving an aimless eye and resounding
ear,45) we must have a carefully worked-out plan in advance. Otherwise we will
be wrecked in the midst of a great sea of papers. The total of literatures about
Zeno in status quo amounts to the volumes filling up a hovel. For a long period
from the fifth century B.C. to our century, a number of people have tried to
solve Zeno’s paradoxes and preserved their own results. It is proverbially said
that many drops make a shower. Thus, if we are excessively absorbed in carp-
ing at trifle differences between the multifarious interpretations and in adher-
ing to giving one comment after others endlessly, we will be destined after all
to become Achilles or Tristram Shandy who could not attain their objects.
They are persons from whose blunders we should educe a lesson for us.
My task is to excavate Zeno’s real figure, which a large quantity of surface
soil covers. In order to dig up the real Zeno successfully, we must break
through the bulky layers of documents and interpretations. These layers con-
sist of four sub-layers: (1) the readings of the text, (2) the philological inter-
pretations, (3) historical observations, and (4) the philosophical
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interpretations. In our task of excavation we must pay our due attention to a
focal point whereto various significant testimonies and discourses from these
different sub-layers converge. This is the topos, in other words “common
place,”46) or “common premises”47) of the “Zeno” problems. Here is the thres-
hold from where we should begin to trench in search of Zeno’s invisible figure.
Still, there are numerous literatures derived from these sub-layers. Therefore,
in order to minimize references, cross-references and quotations as much as
possible, we are obliged to select some suitable persons for our enterprise.
This is a hard task which tends to give rise the various uncontrollable objec-
tions.
However, I dare to mark (1) Aristotle and Simplicius (for the reading of
text), (2) G. Vlastos and G. E. L. Owen (for the philological interpretation),
(3) T. L. Heath and . (for the historical observation in the field of
Greek mathematics), (4) B. Pascal, H. Bergson, and B. Russell (for the philo-
sophical interpretation) out for their positions.
(1i) The selection of Aristotle is a supreme order. As it was said previ-
ously, there is no way to grope for Zeno’s four arguments against motion with-
out relying on Aristotle’s report in the Physics Z 9, 239b5240a18. (1ii) And
if we cannot consult with Simplicius the best commentator of Aristotle’
Physics, our information about Zeno might become a very poor and partial.
(2i) As one of the representatives of the Classical world in the twentieth
century G. Vlastos left a series of papers on Zeno’s paradoxes, which has been
evaluated by authorities as the distinguished achievements. His works on
Zeno held undisputed leadership among others. (2ii) The same can be said
about G. E. L. Owen too. He made a significant contribution to the study of
Eleatics. (3i) Up to now the importance of T. L. Heath’s works in the field
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of Greek mathematics still remains to be unchanged. It is a miracle fact. (3ii)
	contribution to the study concerning the origin of Greek axiomatic
and deductive mathematics was strongly provoked by his own study of
Eleatics, especially of Zeno. (4i) B. Pascal was, in my view, a “Jansenist
Zeno” who developed an original idea of the “two contrary infinities” which
tells the whereabouts of Cartesian intellect and which bears a close resem-
blance to Zeno’s Dichotomy and Achilles. (4ii) For H. Bergson who was one
of the representatives of the Philosophical world in the early period of the
twentieth century Zeno’s paradox was his philosophical starting point.
Throughout his philosophical life Bergson continued to return to this starting
point repeatedly. However, it is an ironical fact that he himself regarded Zeno
as the founder of the fallaciousness of the modern-scientific way of thinking.
(4iii) One may say that my selection of B. Russell is rather arbitrary. Yes,
but, Russell’s mathematical discourse about Zeno’s arguments against motion,
in which he uttered a famous appraisal of Zeno’s four paradoxes, is so keen and
suggestive that for the students of Zeno’s paradoxes it became something
special like a place of pilgrimage, where everyone ought to visit at least once.
Making an objection against my method one may reproach me as follows:
‘Your way of doing things is nothing but to make an extravagant advertise-
ment. Yet your real way of selection is too confined and old-fashioned.’ But, I
do not think so. Selecting the above mentioned persons, I intend to give sign-
posts with reference to which we can go through a subterranean passage
which leads into whereabouts of the real Zeno. Thus, the selection does not
prevent to refer to many other persons who range from Homer to A. Einstein.
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III THE FIRST LAYER OF ZENO’S PARADOXES
Now let me begin to dig up the first layer of Zeno’s paradoxes and make in-
vestigation into Zeno’s strategy which lies behind the surface of his four argu-
ments against motion. What was Zeno’s real intention in the four arguments
against motion? To answer this question we must take up afresh each of the
four arguments again and examine in detail the property of the target which
they aim at and the interrelationship between them.
1 THE DICHOTOMY
The Dichotomy says: ‘An object in motion is not in motion, because a thing
in motion must reach the half-way point before it gets to the end.’ In this argu-
ment Zeno presupposes that the motion which reaches ‘the half-way point’ had
to have been completed before it gets to the end. Pay attention to a fact that
even the motion getting to the end is, by a tacit consent, presupposed to have
been completed.
This is confirmed by Aristotle’s another reference to the Dichotomy at Phys.
, 263a4 where he says:
‘The same method should also be adopted in replying to those who ask,
in the terms of Zeno’s argument, whether we admit that before any dis-
tance can be traversed half the distance must be traversed, that these
half-distances are infinite in number, and that it is impossible to traverse
distances infinite in number.’
On the other hand Simplicius in his comments on the above quoted
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Aristotelian context says as follows:
‘The argument of Zeno, to which he [Aristotle] now refers, was as fol-
lows: If there is motion there will be something which has traversed
(	) an infinite number of positions in a finite time; for, since the
process of dichotomy can continue infinitely, in every continuum there
will be an infinite number of halves owing to every part of it having a half.
Therefore a body which has moved (
) over a finite distance
will have traversed (	) an infinite number of halves in a finite
time, that is, in the time which it took to traverse the finite distance in
question.’48)
Each of the italicized expressions is in the present perfect tense. The fact
makes it obvious that Simplicius here regards the Dichotomy as an argument
which presupposes an infinite series of completed motion.49)
To sum up, the Dichotomy proceeds as follows: In the first place we are
induced to imagine an admirable runner like swift Achilles who has finally over-
taken Hector ‘when for the fourth time they were come to the springs,’50) who
have traversed successfully the entire course. Now in the first stage the runner
who reached successfully the goal is wiping his face free of perspiration. But
in the second stage, the runner is accused of a crime by Zeno the judge for
“the failure of the infinite halves running.”
The gist of accusation is as follows: ‘The accused states that he completed
his running along the course. But it must be false, because if he could have
traversed the entire course of stadium he should be able to count or touch as
often as each of the half-way points as he comes to it one by one. But it is
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beyond doubt that there are an infinite number of the half-way points in the
course, because it is a continuum and every continuum has an infinite number
of halves.51) And it is obvious that nobody can count or touch an infinite number
of the half-way points one by one. Therefore, it is obvious also that he could
not traverse the entire course of the stadium. Thus, the runner who is alleged
to have traversed the entire course of stadium has not really traversed the
course. Therefore also a body (which is alleged to be) in motion is not in
motion.’
It is difficult to identify which type of half-way running Aristotle had in his
mind when he referred to the Dichotomy saying that: ‘An object in motion must
reach the half-way point before it gets to the end.’ What remains to be unclear
is the implication of the phrase ‘before (	
)
G be the goal. Then, the runner must first
reach the half-way point a between S and G before he gets to G. But, thereafter,
towards which direction does he move? There are two possibilities: (1) the
runner moves backward; then, he must first reach the half-way point x between
S and a before getting to a, and so on; or (2) the runner moves forward; then,
he must reach half-way point b between a and G before getting to G, and so on.
Philoponus took the former interpretation and said:
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‘If anything moves along a given finite straight line, it must, before mov-
ing along the half of the whole, move along a quarter of it, and before a
quarter an eighth, and so on ad infinitum; for the continuum is infinitely
divisible.’52)
Recognizing the Dichotomy as a kind of an “infinite regress” argument Ross
also took sides with the former interpretation.53) It is provably a natural inter-
pretation. But, the issue is controversial among scholars. For example, with
some legitimate reasons G. Vlastos took sides with the latter interpretation to
which however I will refer later and present some objections.
Be that as it may, this issue does not pose the essential problem. The fun-
damental problem which the Dichotomy brings forward has its essential rele-
vance with motion “on the way from x to y,” in other words, with the concept
of “between-ness;” i.e., the “extension” and its “denseness.” A. 
tried to construe the Dichotomy and the Achilles as ‘offering a reductio ad
absurdum of the denseness of physical time and of motion but not as denying
their existence (“reality”).’54) This is a keen insight to which I will later
develop an argument.
2 THE ACHILLES
Aristotle himself calls Zeno’s second argument against motion simply “the
so-called Achilles” and treats it as essentially the same as the Dichotomy:
‘	
	
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
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
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 	
	


	
				
		 	
		
	!			 		"
	"	"#
(‘This argument is essentially the same as that depending on dichotomy,
but differs in that the successively given lengths are not divided into
halves. The conclusion of the argument is that the slower runner55) is not
overtaken, but it proceeds on the same lines as the dichotomy argument,
since in both, being divided the distance in a given way, it is concluded
that the goal is not reached: only in the Achilles a dramatic effect is pro-
duced by saying that not even the swiftest will be successful in its pursuit
of the slowest and so the solution of it must be the same.)56)
It is a notable fact that Aristotle in the above quotation refers to the “dra-
matic effect” (		
) of Zeno’s second argument. But, the saying
seems to be somewhat beside the point, if we could not know Achilles’ rival.
Who is Achilles’ rival?
According to Simplicius the commentator, Achilles’ rival is a tortoise.
Simplicius insists that Zeno’s second paradox against motion, the Achilles, was
so called ‘because of the introduction into it of Achilles, who cannot possibly
overtake the tortoise he is pursuing.’57) But, why does a tortoise make its ap-
pearance all of a sudden? It is, according to H. D. P. Lee, because of its dra-
matic and sensational effect.
Referring to the word-meanings of ‘		
$%) Lee said as follows:
‘the introduction of Achilles and the tortoise in this [second argument], of the
flying arrow in the next argument, and of the stadium in the last give them a
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certain vivid and dramatic quality, of which Aristotle evidently thoroughly disap-
proved, but which seems to have been very characteristic of Zeno’s reasoning.’
[italic by Yamakawa]59)
But, what does Aristotle’s disapproval in this context exactly mean? On this
matter W. D. Ross said as follows:
‘In fact, practically the only detail that reaches us independently of him
[Aristotle] is that Achilles’ rival in Zeno’s parable was a tortoise. This
comes to us from the Greek commentators on Aristotle. The reference to
the tortoise comes also from Plutarch, but in Plutarch the tortoise is
matched not against Achilles but against “the fast horse of Adrastus,”60) so
that possibly Achilles’ rival was not a tortoise at all, and two independent
stories may have got mixed up in the familiar title.’61)
I do not know, of course, what kind of the opponent party of Achilles Ross
had in mind by his saying that ‘possibly Achilles’ rival was not a tortoise at
all.’ For my part, however, contrary to Ross’ conjecture, I surmise that Zeno
himself regarded originally a tortoise as Achilles’ opponent party.
It is a definite fact that “the swiftest runner” () refers to Achilles
the hero. Then, why is “the slowest runner” (	
) a tortoise?
(1) In Homer’s Iliad we can witness an imposing figure of Achilles, who is
pursuing at full speed Hector as though he were ’a falcon () ...
the swiftest of winged things (
).’62)
(2) Homer in the above context likens Hector to “a trembling dove” (

).63) Therefore, a pair of ‘Achilles : Hector’ in this context is
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likened to the pair of “a falcon : a trembling dove.’
(3) But, the supposition that “the slowest runner” in Zeno’s context is
“Hector” is out of question. Hector is never a slowest runner. At Iliad,
XXII. 164166 a footrace between two heroes is depicted as follows:
‘These two heroes circled thrice with swift feet (	


)
about the city of Priam.’ Hector is not a tardy runner, but Achilles’ ca-
pable rival. 64)
Who is, then, the slowest runner? According to Simplicius it was a tortoise
(). But, why is a tortoise Achilles’rival? Why cannot Achilles’ opponent
party be a trembling “dove” or a “fawn”? Is it not by any chance a forgery by
Simplicius?
The last supposition however comes into collision with evidences. In the
first place, Simplicius could presumably consult with a copy of Zeno’s original
book65) or at least he could resort to ancient reports of Zenonian arguments
from a good source such as one of Theophrastos.66) Second, there is a fact that,
before and apart from Simplicius, Themistius too refers to the “tortoise” as
Achilles’ competitor.67) In addition to this, third, Simplicius himself refers to
Hector who is never overtaken by Achilles.68)
‘				

		, 		 			
 !
"	#’
(‘And so by taking distances decreasing in a given proportion ad infinitum
because of the infinite divisibility of magnitudes, we arrive at the conclu-
sion that not only will Hector never be overtaken by Achilles, but not
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even the tortoise.)
In this context of Simplicius’ utterance, it is obvious that Simplicius has in
mind two parties of the running match; that is, (a) a party of Achilles and
Hector and (b) another party of Achilles and a tortoise.
The diagram (a) is a familiar one for the reader of Homer’s Iliad. But, (b)
is unfamiliar and unexpected one, which has, as Aristotle said, a dramatic effect
and might caused a sensation among people. Then, who is the inventor of the
diagram (b)?
It is a noteworthy fact that the above pair of (a) and (b) is a compressed ex-
pression derived from the following diagram:
And this diagram seems to hide its behind the third party whose one com-
petitor is tortoise, but another competitor is unknown “x”:
Someone has substituted “x” for “Achilles.” Then, who is “x” and who was
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(a) Achilles
(b) Achilles
Hector
Tortoise
Achilles Hector
Tortoise
Achilles Hector
Tortoise( x )
the author of a pair “Achilles and Tortoise”? I surmise that “x” is a “hair” and
the original author of “Achilles and Tortoise” is Zeno of Elea.
Before the problem in question is settled, we must take up another problem,
which invites us to adopt one of the alternatives; either (1) Zeno produced an
argument against motion, the title of which was originally “Achilles and Tor-
toise.” or (2) Zeno did not give a particular title to the second argument,
whereas in his context of argument he assigned a part of “the slowest run-
ner” to a tortoise and “the swiftest” to Achilles.
Reviewing the opening scene of Plato’s Parmenides, we find that the latter
alternative appears to hit the mark. When the reading of a part of Zeno’s book
finished, Socrates at 127d-e asked to hear the “hypothesis” of “the first argu-
ment” again. It is a noteworthy fact that Socrates does not make mention of
their titles. It seems, therefore, they had originally no titles. On the other
hand, the style of hypothetical argument presented by Zeno in the same dia-
logue is indeed reminiscent of Zeno’s genuine arguments against “plurality”
preserved by Simplicius.69) They are very abstract and dialectical. But the mat-
ter does not always eliminate the case that Zeno appealed to people’s imagina-
tion.70) Gorgias’ ‘On What Is Not or Concerning Nature’ presents the parallel
case.71) In the midst of developing very difficult and abstract argument Gorgias
could effectively use some vivid words such as “a man flying,” “chariot run-
ning over the sea,” etc.72)
Now let’s return to the above mentioned question: ‘Why did Zeno adopt a
“tortoise” as the competitor of Achilles? To this question I have no other hy-
pothesis than that Zeno had presumably in mind Aesop’s fable “Tortoise and
Hare” or one of its variations.
But, did Zeno really know this fable? Yes, I think so. The fable in question
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dates back at least to Zeno’s contemporary age. For it is included in the
Augustana Recension whose primary source is possibly the Aesopia, the first
collection of Aesopic fables published by Demetrius of Phalerum in the end of
the fourth century B.C. or in the beginning of the third century B. C.73)
Demetrius of Phalerum compiled the Aesopic fables which were in circulation
for a long time among Greeks and which was published ‘as a handbook of ma-
terials intended primarily for the use of writers and speakers.’74)
It is a well-known fact that Aristophanes utilized often Aesop’s fables in his
dramatization.75) Socrates in prison also was concerned with versification of
Aesop’s fables in his last days.76) Similarly for Hesiod, Sophocles, Herodotus,
Xenophon, Plato, and Aristotle too the animals like eagle, beetle, fox, lark,
hare, and tortoise etc. making their appearances in the Aesopic fables were, in
greater or lesser degree, familiar ones. Thus, there is nothing to be wondered
about a fact that Zeno himself also was familiar with Aesopic fables.
However, you may still ask me stubbornly: ‘Is it sure that Zeno was familiar
with the fable “Tortoise and Hare”?’ I do not know exactly whether it was the
case or not. But, it is sure that Menedemus the contemporary rhetorician of
Plato was well informed of this fable. Once quoting the lines from the Omphale,
a satiric drama of Achaeus the tragicus, Menedemus attacked his political op-
ponents,:
‘Ere long the swift is overtaken by the feeble,
And the eagle () by the tortoise (	
).’77)
Note that this is another version of “Tortoise and Hare.” The ‘eagle’ corre-
sponds to a ‘falcon’ in the above-mentioned Homeric passage.
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Thus, it is obvious that the Zenonian analogy of ‘The Swiftest : The Slowest
= Achilles : Tortoise’ must have been very suggestive and impressive for eve-
ryone who has been already well versed in the Homeric analogy: ‘Achilles:
Hector = Falcon : Dove’ as well as Aesopic fable ‘Tortoise and Hare’ or its
variations.
As you know well now, to win the hearts of the people by arousing their
vivid imagination was Zeno’s important strategy.
Now, if the above mentioned hits somehow the mark, I hope, the following
imaginary dialogue between Achilles and Tortoise also may be regarded as a
not so bad revision of Lewis Carroll’s witty tale. It is a sequel to the footrace
of Achilles and Tortoise which touches the core meaning of Zeno’s second ar-
gument against motion.78)
Suppose the swift runner Achilles could overtake a tardy tortoise at a spot
n, and now sitting triumphantly on the tortoise’s back, he arrogantly says as
follows:
Achilles : ‘I have conquered you. Now, you must admit your loss!’
Tortoise: ‘Hmmm ... but, I cannot believe my ... rather unpleasant ... state of
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Achilles Hector
TortoiseHare
(Falcon) (Dove)
Homer’s Iliad
Aesopic fable
(Slowest)
(Swiftest)
affairs. Disclose your trick, Oh, no! ...but strategy, or way of run-
ning, so I may concede my loss.’
Achilles : ‘Well, listen to my words carefully and satisfy yourself of your mis-
erable situation. My way of running was a splendid one. In the first
step, I covered a distance greater than a half of the distance which
could be shown as a length between the starting point and your final
spot here. And in the second step, I covered a distance greater than
a half of that which was left. Thus repeatedly employing such a
strategy, I finally overtook you, and now I am resting comfortably o
your back. Do you understand?’
Tortoise: ‘Oh, I see. Your way of running was really based on the Axiom of
Archimedes.’
Achilles : ‘Not ‘Archimedes’, but Euclid’s Elements X. Prop. 1. In any way you
are not enlightened about the history of mathematics.’
Tortoise: ‘Don’t mind such a trifling matter. Well, I recommend you to listen
to Zeno’s argument. He says: “Even the slowest runner, when in
motion, can never be overtaken by the fastest, for, inevitably, the
pursuer must first reach the point from which the pursued started;
it means that the slowest runner will always remain ahead.” If your
way of running were Zeno’s, I could never be overtaken by you,
since he assures us that the two distances covered by you and me
were really incommensurable.’
The Achilles is, according to Aristotle, ’essentially the same as that depend-
ing on the Dichotomy, but differs in that the successively given lengths (
	
		) are not divided into halves.’ Therefore, it is
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beyond doubt that in this argument too the motion is viewed in the aspect of
the perfect tense and its subject is the problem of the between-ness and the
denseness of extension. But, the Achilles can be regarded also as a representa-
tion of the process of successive subtraction between two incommensurable
quantities. Here in this context, with prominent free use of reduction ad
absurdum and possibly the theory of “even and odd” which was employed in
Euclid’s Elenments VII and IX, the incommensurability between two distances
traversed by Tortoise and Achilles becomes afresh to be actualized in connec-
tion with the method of “successive subtraction” (	
	

).79)
The fact will introduce us to the mathematical dimension of Zeno’s second
argument.
3 THE ARROW
The Arrow might immediately remind the reader of the Odyssey the famous
scene in the Odyssey XXI 76423, where Odysseus shoots an arrow through all
twelve of the axes. Arousing such a thrilling feeling in the public, Zeno in the
next stage declares that the arrow passing through all the twelve sockets of
the axes is toties quoties in its passing through each socket and consequently
also always at rest during its flying.
Unfortunately, the Arrow’s text is corrupt and incomplete. It reads ‘		
	at 239b56. But this reading appears to be inconsistent with
succeeding sentence: ‘
Following Themistius’ reading
		Zeller ejected	on the ground that Zeno’s concern here
is to give the definition of “rest.” Burnet, Cornford, Ross and others too fol-
lowed this reading.80)
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However, I think, we should follow Diels’ emendation.81) Preserving ‘
	
	he inserted immediately after this
	
	. It seems
to be legitimately acceptable, because we read 
	or its equivalent in
Simplicius’ and Philoponus’ texts.82) As Lee insists, there is no manuscript
authority for omitting them. Hence, we should suppose not that ‘
	is
an insertion, but that original words such as 
	
	dropped out.83)
However the adoption of Diels’ reading appears to come immediately into
collision with D. Ross’ apparent reasoning. Ross insisted that ‘
	would
be in point only if Zeno had argued disjunctively ...’84) But, without fail Zeno
here argues deliberately disjunctively. For Zeno’s premise ‘	
	
should be regarded as a specimen of the Parmenidean law of the ex-
cluded middle.85)
In order to confirm the cardinal point of Zeno’s logical manoeuvre in the
Arrow, let me turn a while to the conclusions of the Arrow I and II:
The Arrow I The arrow in motion is motionless. (1)
The Arrow II The arrow in motion is at rest. (2)
However, the above (1) and (2) in lump have the same import:
The arrow which is in motion is not in motion. (3)
And the above (3), after all, entails that
The same arrow is and is not in motion at the same time. (4)
The above (4) is a plain absurdity which violates the law of contradiction.
Therefore, we must approve that the negation of (4) is true:
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It is not the case that the same thing is and is not in motion at the same
time. (5)
Then, the above (5) entails the following:
The same thing is either in motion or is not in motion at the same
time. (6)
And the above (6) is substantially equivalent to the statement that ‘every-
thing is either at rest or in motion (	
	),’ which is nothing
but Zeno’s major premise in the Arrow I. Therefore, in spite of Ross’ apparent
judgement, Zeno in the Arrow argues in reality disjunctively.
By the way, the above (6) is, as we can appreciate immediately, just a varia-
tion of the following more general principle:
The same thing is either in the place where it is or in the place where it
is not at the same time. (7)
In truth Zeno’s fundamental premise against motion is this exclusive dis-
junction. And we can confirm the case in [1] DL, IX. 72 (DK, B4), [2]
Epiphanius, Adv. Haer. III. 11 (Diels, Dox. 590. 20), and [3] Sextus Empiricus,
Outlines of Pyrrhonism, III. 71.86)
[1] A thing in motion is not in motion either in the place where it is or
in the place where it is not.87)
[2] A thing in motion is in motion either in the place where it is, or in the
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place where it is not; and it is not in motion either in the place where
it is or in the place where it is not; therefore nothing is in motion.88)
[3] If a thing is in motion, it is in motion either in the place where it is
or in the place where it is not. But it is not in motion in the place in
which it is, for if it is in it, it remains in it; nor yet it is in motion in
the place where it is not; for where a thing is not, there it can neither
effect nor suffer anything. Therefore nothing is in motion.89)
The testimony [1] exactly corresponds to each of the second half of [2] and
[3] respectively. Therefore, if the fragment [1] preserves a genuine part of
Zeno’s Arrow, we may regard each of [2] and [3] as a fairly trustworthy rep-
lica of Zeno’s Arrow.
Now, it is a noteworthy fact that Epiphanius and Sextus Empiricus begin
their reports with the following words:
[2] A thing in motion is in motion either in the place where it is, or in the
place where it is not.90)
[3] If a thing is in motion, it is in motion either in the place where it is
or in the place where it is not.91)
Except for a minor difference in their syntactical construction, both of [2]
and [3] bear a close resemblance between them. So we may suppose that both
of them are substantially trustworthy replicas of Zeno’s Arrow and the logical
form which they hold in common can be legitimately attributed to Zeno’s origi-
nal argument, which may be strictly reformulated as follows:
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A thing in motion is in motion either in the place where it is now or in the
place where it is not now. (8)
Note a fact that in the above (8) there is an illegitimate disjunct: ‘a thing in
motion is in motion in the place where it is not now.’ This disjunct is of course
false; you in a class room here and now cannot be singing a song in a broad-
casting station far from here 2 km where you are not now; similarly, an astro-
naut who is now under training in NASA, cannot play golf on the surface of the
moon at the same time. Therefore, in reality, there remains just one disjunct,
namely ‘in the place where it is now.’92)
Then, what does a definitive word “now” in this context mean? We must re-
member that Aristotle in the Arrow I criticized Zeno’s argument as follows:
This is false; since time is not composed of a number of indivisible now
any more than any other magnitude is composed of indivisibles (
	
	
	
	
	

	)
But, in so expressing his view, which kind of “indivisible now” did Aristotle
have in mind? We must be careful to distinguish between Zenonian indivisible
“now” in the Arrow I & II and the Aristotelian one. Aristotle defines the
“now” as ‘the limit up to which the past has run, none of the future being this
side of it, and also as the limit from which the future runs, none of the past
being that side of it.’93) He insists that in such an indivisible now anything nei-
ther can be in motion nor at rest. Such an indivisible now is, according to
Aristotle, is not time, but only a limit of time.94) It has no extension wherein a
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thing can be in motion or at rest. Hence, such an “indivisible now” never
authorizes one to infer the alleged Zeno’s conclusion that ‘the arrow in motion
is at rest.’ And yet, it is notable, Aristotle in the Arrow II insists that the con-
clusion in question follows from Zeno’s assumption of the “indivisible now.”95)
Therefore, it is obvious that the indivisible “now”, which Aristotle attributes
to Zeno in the Arrow II, is different from Aristotelian one as a limit between
the past and the future.
Therefore it is considerably clear that Aristotle here attributes to Zeno the
assumption of “atomic now,” i.e. of the “indivisible present” with minimum
magnitude. The case can be ascertained by a fact that Aristotle says that time
is not composed of a number of indivisible now any more than any other mag-
nitude is composed of indivisibles.’ The statement may be regarded as a lemma
of his conclusion at Phys., 232a2325 where it is said that ‘it is impossible for
anything continuous to be composed of indivisible parts.’96) There Aristotle
argues that if length and motion are indivisible, it is necessary that ‘time also
be indivisible, i.e. be composed of indivisible nows’ (	

	
	
)but, according to Aristotle, every motion is divisible;
therefore time must be also divisible.97) The reasoning however tacitly presup-
poses that the indivisible time in question has a magnitude and divisible.
Similarly Aristotle at 233b15ff argues that ‘neither a line nor a surface nor
in fact anything continuous can be indivisible’ and proceeds to demonstrate the
case. The very core of the demonstration consists in that ‘the opposite as-
sumption implies the divisibility of the indivisible.’ That is to say ‘the indivisible
will be divisible, and that which has no parts will be passed over not in an in-
divisible but in a greater time.’98) What is called here “which has no part” is not
the limit between the past and the future but the indivisible time-dimension.99)
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Thus Aristotle here without fail presupposes that the indivisible “now” has a
magnitude.100) Therefore it is obvious also that Aristotle here has in mind the
atomic “now.” In the De Generatione et Corruptione Aristotle similarly tries to
refute an argument ‘which is believed to establish the necessity of atomic
magnitude.’101) The theory, according to him, erroneously assents to that there
must be indivisible bodies and magnitudes, because of a fact that the infinite di-
vision of a magnitude involves an absurdity.102)
Needless to say, such an atomistic conception of magnitude may be regarded
as a response to Zeno’s refutation against the plurality,103) i.e. a response to the
antinomy of the so-called Zeno’s metrical paradox of extension.104) According to
Simplicius Zeno developed an argument which ‘was thought to prove by means
of dichotomy that what is, is one only, and accordingly without parts and indi-
visible:’105)
For, he argues, if it were divisible, then suppose the process of dichotomy
to have taken place: then either there will be left certain ultimate magni-
tudes, which are minima and indivisible, but infinite in number, and so the
whole will be made up of minima but of an infinite number of them; or
else it will vanish and be divided away into nothing, and so be made up of
parts that are nothing. Both of which conclusions are absurd. It cannot
therefore be divided, but remains one.
This is a destructive dilemma that leads anyone who adopts either the one
horn of indivisible and infinite “minima” or the other horn of “parts that are
nothing” into self-contradiction. An important aspect of Zeno’s argument
against plurality consists in the way of Parmenidian juxtaposition between
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what has dimensions and what is dimension-less.106) Aristotle’s formulation of
the Arrow corresponds to this Zenonian structure and refers to the Zenonian
first horn; he puts the supposition of infinite and indivisible time which
Diodorus Cronus revived in later period in question.107) Diodorus Cronus ar-
gues within the framework of Zeno’s metrical paradoxes. Originally he had
nothing to develop his novel contrivance. As we have confirmed Diodorus
Cronus invoked literally Zeno’s disjunctive inference to refute the possibility
of motion. The idea of the atomic “now” indwelled originally in Zeno’s concep-
tion of a version of commonsensical conception of time, let alone the well-
polished Aristotelian conception of the limit between the past and the fu-
ture.108)
The atomic “now” is never a castle in air which some scholars’ ‘neat fanta-
sy’ produced.109) It is just an original device due to Zeno himself. For Zeno’
metrical paradoxes had a contrivance to suspend Parmenides’ adversaries in
midair between both extremities of continuity and atomicity.
Here, however, as Barnes and many other scholars did, you may object to
me saying that where is ‘evidence that anyone prior to Zeno had entertained
the atomistic theory he is imagined to be attacking.’110) But this is quite ridicu-
lous. First, you should be aware of the absurdity of a dogma that a new hy-
pothesis should coincide with a ready-made one. As Feyerabend in Against
Method said, such a belief is plainly irrational, because it hinders the develop-
ment of a new theory.111) Second, it is not necessary to specify the names of
Zeno’s adversaries. You should rather be aware of a technical fault of your way
of arresting the criminal. Before identifying in a hit-or-miss manner an individ-
ual with a criminal, you should have a theory of the criminal investigation
which permits you squeeze a particular person to the last penny. This was, I
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believe, Zeno’s method.
By the way, it is noteworthy that P. Curd modestly foresaw a new figure of
Zeno. According to her Zeno ‘is surely an Eleatic,’ but ‘also a serious philos-
opher’ who raised the problems about ‘the divisibility of a basic entity’ ‘with
which Plato and Aristotle will both wrestle.’112) Well, but, we should keep in
mind a fact that not only both of Plato and Aristotle but also Aaxagoras,
Empedocles, Leucippus and Democritus also had to wrestle with the problems
of divisibility and indivisibility within a framework of dragnet which was origi-
nally spread by Zeno who aimed at catching all the pluralists including the pro-
spective adversaries in future. Then, can you specify and name a prospective
criminal in future?
So far we have confirmed that the Arrow begins with presupposition of the
indivisible “now” as atomic one. The issue naturally extends to the interpreta-
tion of 	
Aristotle believed that spatial magnitude, motion and
time are isomorphic each other; he believed that if motion is divisible, the
other two are also divisible; and if the motion is indivisible, the other two are
also indivisible.113) Thus Aristotle says: ‘For because magnitude is continuous,
motion is also continuous, and time because of motion.’114) Therefore, we
should naturally consider that Aristotle in the Arrow too presupposes such an
isomorphism between them. Then, we should approve of Cornford’s remark at
the note 2 in LCL to the reading of rcF (	





	
) as a legitimate one. He said as follows: ‘At every moment the
moving thing is occupying the moment (of the time occupied by its whole
movement) which corresponds to the space equal to its dimensions,’ provided
that ‘the time is supposed to be made up of a row of successive indivisible mo-
ments corresponding, one to one, with the row of successive positions
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occupied by the body.’115) The words permit us to draw the following figure:
The row T consists of a series of the atomic nows 1, 2, 3, ...; M shows a se-
ries of the successive movement which has to correspond one by one to a se-
ries of the indivisible places 1, 2, 3, ... of the row P; x is a pointed head of an
arrow which must be regarded as an atomic magnitude in motion. Then, the
figure 4 shows the location of x at atomic now2 which strictly corresponds to
the indivisible place2. But it should be the case that at the immediately before
atomic time1, x was located on the place1. Then, how could x travelled from
place1 to place2? By no means, if you mean a continual locomotion by the word
“travelling.”
You cannot suppose a case such that the figure 5 depicts, where time and
space each of which is to be indivisible must be divided, therefore also x itself
according to the isomorphic principle. So, you are necessitated to say that
‘x jerks.’ It is irrational to ask once again when this jerk does happen, because
there is no other time than the atomic now. At this juncture we may listen to
Bertrand Russell’s words [Note a fact that what Russell calls “instant” is noth-
ing but the atomic “now.”]:
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At each of the thousand instants, the arrow is where it is, though at the
next instant it is somewhere else. It is never moving, but in some miracu-
lous way the change of position has to occur between the instants, that is
to say, not at any time whatever.116)
Now let me return to our initial concern and let me schematize the logical
structure of the Arrow which underlies the above quoted the Arrow I and II in
order to discern the Eleatic marks therein:
1. Everything is either in the place where it is or in the place where it is
not.117)
2. Everything is either in motion or not in motion.
3. If an arrow is in motion, then it is in motion either in the place where
it is or in the place where it is not.
4. If it is in the place where it is, then it is in the place equal to itself118)
and remains119) to be in the place where it is. Hence it is not in motion.
5. The alternative supposition that an arrow is in the place where it is not
now is logically absurd. Hence its motion is unconceivable.
6. If an arrow is not in motion, then it is neither in motion in the place
where it is nor in the place where it is not.
7. If it is in the place where it is, then it is in the place equal to itself and
remains to be in the place where it is. Hence the arrow, again, is not
in motion.120)
8. The supposition that the arrow is in the place where it is not now is
logically absurd.
9. It is impossible that the same thing is and is not in the same place at
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the same time.121)
Therefore, a thing in motion is not in motion.
It is an interesting fact that we can discern in the above schematization of
Zeno’s Arrow a number of Eleatic marks; especially his free use of the law of
the excluded middle which Parmenides habitually used in his defence of
“what is” and negation of “not being.”122)
Relying on Parmenidean way of thinking, Zeno was likely at pains to con-
struct a proposition, the subject of which is directly contradicted with its predi-
cate: ‘A is not-A.’ Pay attention to a fact that A, the initially given subject, is
a vivid perceptual object like a runner on the course, Achilles and a tortoise,
and a flying arrow sailing across the midair. In other words, they are plain
things with which everybody is well acquainted in their everyday life. But, in
the next stage, in the part of predication, he will show you the invisible mecha-
nism or circumstances where the runner is necessitated to complete his infi-
nite half-way running or where a flying arrow must eternally be frozen. Thus,
while the object occupying the position of the subject is a visible thing, one
which you witness in the part of predication is an invisible thing.
In the case of the Arrow, however, there is another point which we should
bear in mind. Aristotle referred to the Arrow two times. And in the second
time when he mentions to the Arrow II he introduces it as ‘the third,’ in spite
of his previous reference to the Arrow I at Phys. Z 9., 239b514. This fact sug-
gests that the ordering of the argument originates from Zeno himself. For
Zeno the Arrow’s position among the other three arguments logically had to be
“the third.”123) The Arrow so considered is, in my view, a finishing blow against
those who were damaged by Zeno’s preceding two arguments against motion,
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i.e., the Dichotomy and the Achilles. He anticipated that they will cling to the
“now” in order to recover their lost territory. To catch them with one throw
Zeno spread a dragnet, i.e. the Arrow. Zeno surmised that they will persis-
tently insist as follows: ‘Even if there is something like truth in what Zeno
says, it is beyond doubt that the motion is real and that a moving body is in mo-
tion now, in this instantaneous moment.’
Rejecting this claim flatly the Arrow declares that: ‘what is in motion is al-
ways in a given now occupying a place equal to itself. Therefore, the arrow in
motion is not in motion.’ In other words Zeno argued as follows:
‘An arrow, if it were to fly, will be helped fly now in the threshold of indi-
visible moment. For if the moment itself is divisible into infinite parts, it
would have a series of infinite “halves” because of which again the impos-
sibility of motion will be concluded. Therefore, if an arrow is in flying, it
is in flying now in this indivisible moment, occupying a place where it is.
Thus, the arrow in flying now occupies a place equal to itself; and as you
know well, everything occupying a place equal to itself must remain to be
in a place where it is now and does not change its own place; and nothing
can be in motion without changing its place where it is now. Therefore,
the flying arrow is not flying.’
Zeno will go on to address you: ‘you may shout, pointing to a flying arrow:
“Behold, an arrow is now flying!” Well, however, are you really pointing
to a flying arrow? On the contrary, is it not the case that you are pointing
to an object which is in the place whereto you point to? Then, it is in the
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place where it is now; and hence it is at rest and is not in flying. For when
you point to the arrow, it must be in the place whereto you point now. Or
is it possible to point to an arrow being in a place where it is not now? If
you insist persistently that there can be such a case, you are obliged to
explain how you can insist to point to an object which is not now. Thus
you must at all events admit a fact that the alleged flying arrow is in a
place equal to itself and is not in another place where it is not now.
Therefore, it is not in motion. And in every moment during its flying the
arrow always occupies a place equal to itself. Therefore, the flying arrow
is always at rest.’
Thus, in place of a flying arrow a stationary arrow makes its appearance.
4 THE STADIUM
The Stadium is, in my opinion, to be legitimately regarded as a synthetic ar-
gument which occupies its central position among other preceding arguments
against motion; the Dichotomy, the Achilles, and the Arrow. The Stadium em-
bodies various difficulties deduced from those three preceding arguments and
synthesizes their apparently absurd conclusions, which may remind us those
apparent and incomprehensive conclusions that Parmenides the leading char-
acter in Plato’s Parmenides deduced from the eight hypothesises on the Unity
or the One.124) But, before going into the elucidation of it, in the first place, I
want to deal with a problem about the term “bodies” (), which the text
of the Stadium refers to. For the Stadium is presented to us as an argument
about ‘the equal “bodies” () moving from opposite directions alongside
the equal bodies in the stadium the ones from the end of the stadium, the
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others from the middle with equal speeds.’
The text (Aristotle, Phys, Z9, 239b33) runs as follows:
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Unfortunately, the word “bodies” (	) appearing in the text of the
Stadium is rather vague. In general the “	” means “bulk,” “size,” “mass”
of a body and therefore also “body” or “human body;” then, the “	” in plu-
ral means “bodies,” “material substances,” and sometimes “particles” or “mole-
cules” in a special meaning.125) In any way it is not always clear what Zeno had
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in mind by the word “”. Some scholars like Tannery, Burnet, and
Cornford advanced a hypothesis that the “” in the Stadium refers after all
to something like the Pythagorean “point-unit-atom.”126) In contradistinction to
this however R. K. Gaye suggested that the “” in question is due to Zeno
who intended to criticize the “Empedoclean indivisible particles”127)
These conceptions about “Pythagorean “point-unit-atom” or “Empedoclean
indivisible particles” may be somehow evaluated; but, what relevance can
those minute entities like indivisible “atoms” have to the “stadium”, where or-
dinarily some gymnastic contests like running-race among people take place?
Why is it possible that something like the Pythagorean point-units or
Empedoclean particles enter into the race-course? Can such a supposition of
particles’ play in a stadium arouse people’s interest or sensation? Is it not out
of place such conceptions? Is the title Stadium legitimate? Is it not due to
Aristotelian misrepresentation?128) Or is it surely due to Zeno himself who
gave a lecture, like a resourceful teacher of mathematics or physics, who put
down a rectangular figure on the sand (or the board) with a piece of wood (or
a chalk) and spoke as follows?
‘Let it be a “race-course” and let it be that these graphics (	

	
) stand for “xs” which are imagined vividly as “ys” on the race-
course.
I do not know which the case was. In any case, there is nothing we can do
about this issue. We are eventually in Aristotle’s hand,129) as though we were
a swash-buckling monkey in the Great Buddha’s hand.130)
However, Simplicius’ words may be suggestive about the matter. He said
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that Eudemus the author of The History of Geometry called the “” in this
context “cubes” (	).131) And Lee gave a reasonable comment to Simpli-
cius’ saying:
‘I cannot suggest any reason why Eudemus called the bodies cubes, ex-
cept that cubes are, as a matter of fact, very convenient for purposes of il-
lustration. For the movingare of course three-dimensional and if we
take them to be cubes we can represent them two-dimensionally in our
diagram easily enough by squares, the square being the side of the
cube ... fits very well the “cinematographic” motion...’132)
Useful though Lee’s comment is, it does not always scratch where we itch.
He mentioned only to the reason for the graphic-notational convenience. What
we want to know is the reason why Zeno adopted the term “”, which
should have been represented with a pictorial image (let it be ys) and which
should have stood for the pluralist’s material entities (let it be xs).
Leaving aside the last question a while, about the latter question, I believe,
there is a not so irrelevant answer. Let me remind the circumstances where
Parmenides’ opponents ridiculed his doctrine of “what-is” (
). It is a
noteworthy fact that Parmenides likened his “what is” to “the bulk of a
sphere” () which is always “one” (),133) “indivis-
ible” (
)) and “changeless” (
).135) Having this case in
mind firmly you should pay attention to another fact that Zeno intended to re-
tort the opponents of his teacher by making clear the case that their own hy-
pothesis that “plurality is” suffers still more absurd consequences than Parm-
enides’ “one”.136) Then, you will have a glimmering of a fact that Zeno may
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attacked his adversaries’ “” (in plural) in order to defend Parmenides’
“” (in singular). It is proverbially said that ‘an eye for an eye.’ Adhering
to the lex talionis Zeno may have intended to chase his adversaries into self-
contradiction.
However, Parmenides’ 	
was likened to “the bulk of a sphere” (
), not to the “cube” (). What is wrong with spherical bodies
like golf-balls or foot-balls? R. Ferber thought there is nothing wrong with
them and insisted as follows:
‘Der Ausdruckwird von Zenon wieder aufgenommen, und vielleicht
waren auch  im Stadium 
, wohlgerundet, um das
Wettrennen zu machen.’137)
But, as you know well, in reality, the spherical body like a foot ball or a golf
ball is unsuitable for the context of the Stadium. Ponder on again Zeno’s
stance. He attacked the pluralists who ridiculed Parmenides’	
, which was
expressed as
	


	

	
 !

(Thus, it is all continuous, for what is draws near to what is.)138)
Zeno’s adversaries who attacked Parmenides retained in their own part
some theoretical devices which were a match for Parmenidean one; namely a
theoretical model to depict the gapless or possibly seamless world-order.
A ball, a voluminous object, is unsuitable for such a theoretical model.
Imagine the dispersed billiard balls on the table. When two billiard balls stand
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linearly in a row, each of them will (theoretically) have just a point in com-
mon, because each of them is a spherical body and the two spherical bodies
() which are in adjacent relation have just a point in common.139) It is
theoretically impossible to fill up Euclidean space with such voluminous
spheres. Thus, it is obvious in advance that one who intends to construct the
world-order by a number of indivisible spherical bodies will become immedi-
ately a prey of Parmenidean logic.140) Thus ones who could attack him must
have equipped themselves with some more potent devises in order to avoid
such a flaw.
Plato did not inform us who the pluralists in question were. But, irrespec-
tive of who was the inventor of such a device, the “cubes” which were con-
nected closely with one another without any gap could be a potent theoretical
model for the pluralistic world-view which was in rivalry with Parmenides’
	
provided that they should be regarded as the which stand for
the “indivisible” and “minimal” quanta.
So far I have argued for an aspect of as a theoretical model. Now let
me turn to the topic of the setting of the Stadium. Aristotle’s report of this
paradox is lengthy and intricate. It is not only intricate but also obscure. Even
the readings of the transmitted Greek texts themselves are so manifold that
the various interpretations have been given. And yet almost all interpretations
were rather banal and inarticulate ones. A part of the main cause of this disap-
pointing fact is surely due to the vagueness of Aristotle’s words about the lo-
cation of Here I quote again the opening part of Aristotle’s report
with a tentative translation:
				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	
	
			
		
(‘The fourth is the one about the equal bodies which move past each
other in a stadium in opposite directions, the one from the goal of the sta-
dium, the other from the middle-point with equal velocities. This, he
thinks, involves the conclusion that half a given time is equal to its dou-
ble.’)
All the difficulties are derived from the vagueness of interrelationship be-
tween 
(the end) and (the middle) in the above quoted sen-
tence	
			(literally, ‘some from
the end of the stadium on the one hand, and some from the middle on the other
hand’). The standard rendering since Simplicius was one in the following fig-
ure 4. But, there is a flaw in this figure.
Lee points out the flaw as follows: ‘The Cs do start from the end (
) and
the Bs from the middle point (); but whereas it is the last or hindmost
of the Cs which is on the finishing line (
), it is the first or leading B
which is on the middle-line (). And therefore, ‘if we describe the Cs as
starting from the
and the Bs from the, our description is asymmet-
rical as between Cs and Bs.’141)
However, Lee himself attributes this flaw to Aristotle’s lecture-style who
‘made use of a diagram, to which he was continually pointing,’ and says that
‘This passage is therefore certainly intended to be understood in conjunc-
tion with a diagram. If then we suppose him to have used a diagram simi-
lar to that given as fig. 2, it does not seem inconceivable that he should
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have spoken of the Cs starting to move from and the Bs from
	
even though the reference is asymmetrical. For his meaning
could be made quite clear by pointing; and if he pointed first to the
the 	
would of course come next as he moved his hand or
pointer from right to left, and so he might easily describe the position of
the Cs by reference to the , and that of the Bs by reference to the
	
.’142)
Saying so he rejected an alternative interpretation presented by W. D. Ross
who ‘is dissatisfied with this traditional rendering’ and who ‘takes	
in the
sense of the turning point in the double course.’(See below the figure 7 =
Lee’s Fig. 3)
The only difficulty in accepting Ross’ proposal which Lee detected was that
‘there is no authority for giving 	
this sense.’ Thus Lee continues to say
as follows:
‘I can find no instance of it being so used in any ancient author, and in
view of the archaeological evidence it seems to be extremely doubtful
whether Aristotle could so used it.’143)
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 
B
C
B B B
C C C
Figure 6 (Lee’s Fig. 2)
A A AA
Thus in a similar way a number of scholars tried to reconstruct the setting
of the Stadium without getting to a conclusive solution. And some of them ex-
pressed their scepticism to Aristotle’s report and the reliability of traditional
text.
R. Ferber’s interpretation which has been regarded among some scholars as
one of the excellent achievement in the recent study of Zeno’s paradoxes too
can be regarded as a result of such a scepticism against Aristotle and his text.
The outline of his interpretation can be shown in the following figure:144)
According to Ferber’s interpretation, the Stadium is the reversed version of
the Achilles. In the Achilles, he insists, the tortoise and Achilles make trip in
the same direction, whereas in the Stadium two groups of moves in the
opposite direction. One of the groups, the swifter one, has reached the goal
just now and is about to return back to the starting point, when the slower one
is barely at the middle point of the stadium.
But, I think, this is a very dubious and arbitrary interpretation. It is wholly
unclear why two groups of, the one of which is originally swifter than the
other, should in the next stage begin to move at the same speed in the oppo-
site direction. Originally in Aristotle’s report there is no mention to the two
moving bodies at different speeds. They are just an arbitrary fabrication by
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Figure 7
A A AA
Ferber who sought his own interests to identify the interrelationship between
and the. In addition to this, in Ferber’s diagram we cannot exactly
specify where the leading part of B1B2 is, whereas it should become an essen-
tial and urgent issue which must not be left as it is, if the B1B2 were really to
be 	
(voluminous objects) and should pass by the other voluminous ob-
jects C1C2.
To tell the truth, the 	
in plural have no significant role within the
framework of Ferber’s interpretation. They are, according to him, irrelevant to
the essentials of the Stadium. In addition to this, it matters little whether the
two groups of 	
move towards the opposite direction or not. In any way,
they are, according to Ferber, merely the fabrications produced by Aristotle.
Thus Ferber says:
‘Dabei scheint auch noch Abschnitt (a) [Phys., Z 9. 239b34240a1;
Yamakawa’s note] von Aristoteles worden zu sein. Denn das
Zenonische Argument involviert 	
nicht notwendig, sich die
beiden Massengruppen aus entgegengesetzter Richtung bewegen. Sie
das auch aus gleicher tun. Es involviert nicht einmal, sich zwei
Massen-gruppen bewegen, vielmehr 	auch zwei einzelne Massen.
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Figure 8
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An der Substanz des Zenonischen Argumentsdiese aristotelischen
Umdeutungen freilich nichts.’145)
Is this interpretation acceptable? No, this interpretation seems among all to
ignore Ferber’s own maximum: ‘Philosophiehistorie ohne systematische
Philosophie ist blind, systematische Philosophie ohne Philosophiehistorie ist
leer.’146) We must look for a more natural and historically sensitive interpreta-
tion. Does such an interpretation still remain? It is at hand, I believe, in a vari-
ant of Ross’ view, which Ferber superficially dismissed as follows:
‘Im 	
dieser Schwierigkeiten meint W. D. Ross, 	mit der
Mitte des Stadiums der Wendepunkt eines (dann elliptischen oder kreis
) Areals gemeint sei. Doch 	er zugeben, 	auch diese
Interpretation problematisch ist: Denn der Name den
Wendepunkt eines solchen Stadiums () lautet der 	
”.
Er 	weiter zugeben, 	der nur eines von vielen Rennen
war, und ein Ende der Rennbahn, wenn nur eine Runde gelaufen wurde,
nicht Mitte genannt werden konnte. Er akzeptiert denn auch diese
Interpretation nur faute de mieux.’147)
But, this seems to be a myopic view. Open the Book XXIII of the Iliad and
read thoroughly the paragraph where the chariot race in honour of Patroclus
takes place.
At lines 304 ff. we witness Nestor’s fatherly figure who gives his son
Antilochus a good advice as follows:
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(1) ‘You are skilful at turning the chariot round the doubling-post (
	
), but the horses themselves are very slow,
and it is this that will, I fear, mar your chances.’
(2) ‘There is a stump (	326) of a dead tree-oak or pine as it may be-
some six feet above the ground,’ ...
(3) ‘it stands at the turning point of the road (330)
and’
(4) ‘there is a smooth chariot-course all round it (
	330).’
(5) ‘It may have been used as the turning-post [which driving up the right
side of the course, turned round it, and returned by the left side]
(	332) in days gone by.’
(6) ‘Now, however, it has been fixed on by Achilles as the mark round
which the chariots shall turn’ (		331333);
(7) ‘hug it as close as you can, but as you stand in your chariot lean over
a little to the left (		336); urge on your right-hand horse
(336) with voice and lash, and give him a loose
rein,’
() ‘but let the left-hand horse (	338) keep so close in,
that the nave of your wheel shall almost graze
(9) the turning-post. (338)’
And when the five charioteers, Antilochus, Eumelus, Menelaus, Meriones
and Diomed, took their places in line, Homer continues to tell the story:
(10) ‘Achilles showed them the doubling post round which they were to turn,
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some way off upon the plain’ (	

)
()  !"#$%&'&Achilles stationed his father’s follower Phoenix as umpire,
to note the running and report truly.’ (
()))
*)(+),)
)))+	)
)(
))359361)
(12) ‘At the same instant all of them lashed their horses, struck them
with the reins, and shouted at them with all their might. They flew
full speed over the plain away from the ships (-365).’
(13) ‘It was when they were doing the last part of the course on their
way back towards the grey sea (-))374) that their pace
was strained to the utmost and it was seen what each could do.’
‘Meanwhile the Achaeans from their seats were watching how the horses
went, as they scoured the plain amid clouds of their own dust. ... He
[Idomeneus] stood up and said among the Argives: “My friends, princes and
counsellors of the Argives, can you see the running as well as I can? ... Those
that led off at the start must have been disabled out on the plain.’ And he says:
(14) I saw them at first making their way round the doub1ing post’
(
	
.)/462). ...
(15) Perhaps the reins fell from the driver’s hand so that he lost com-
mand of his horses at the doubling post, and could not turn it. ()0
,	
	
+()(/1465
466).”
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In the above long quotation you could immediately distinguish the condi-
tions which correspond one by one to the Stadium. In order to confirm the
case, though it may be regarded as a detour, let me refer to Ross’ claim in his
commentary to the Stadium. He said [italics by Yamakawa]:
The solution lies in the supposition that means the middle of the
complete course along the stadium and back again; in other words the turn-
ing-point. 	
	
then refer to direction, not to position,
and the particular position of the A’s relative to the length of the stadium
is immaterial, as in view of the general nature of the argument it ought to
be. ... It must be admitted thatis apparently not used elsewhere
of the turning-point of the the ordinary name for which is 

It must be admitted also that thewas only one out of many
races that were run in the stadium, and that when only one length was run,
one end of the race-course could not be called theBut if Aristotle had
in mind any race in which an even number of lengths was run, he might
naturally refer to the 
as the ; and a gesture by him as he
drew the figure would make plain what he meant by the. The unnatu-
ralness of the alternative interpretation of the passage seems to me to
outweigh the lack of other evidence for our interpretation of ’148)
Ross referred to ‘the lack of other evidence.’ But, I believe that the above
mentioned setting of the chariot-race in the Iliad XXIII affords a strong evi-
dence which supports fully Ross’ conjecture that means the turning-
point. The following is the reason for this.
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1. The at line 332 & 338 is synonymous with 	
; it is the
turning-post which stands at the middle-point [M] of the entire
course [(5) (9)].
2. Theis called also
or	[(1) (2) (6) (10) (14) (15)]
which stands at the turning point [M] of the entire race-course
[(3) (4)].
3. Thus the chariot-race has three steps:
(i) Driving up the right side of the double course () and ar-
rive at the middle point (turning-point) [(7) (8) (12) (13)];
(ii) turning round the doubling-post towards the opposite direction
[(7) (8) (12) (13)];
(iii) returning back to the winning post by the left side course of the
double course () [(13)].
4. There are two persons who act as umpires; the one is Achilles at the
winning post [W];149) the other is Phoenix at the turning-point whose
role is to note the running and report truly [(10) (11)].
5. It is obvious that the chariot-race in the Book XXIII of the Iliad is a
kind of because the chariot runs ‘full speed over the plain
away from the ships and returns back ‘towards the grey sea’ [(12)
(13)]. It is a race on the double course () in which the char-
iot runs in the first place to the furthest point (=the middle point) of
the entire race-course, then turning the [=
], and
lastly runs back to the starting point by the right side course.
6. Therefore, the [=
] is the middle-point of the entire
race-course.
7. The expressions “” and “” in this context
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naturally refer, as Ross said legitimately, to direction, not to position.
Thus, viewed from this point of view, and 	
may be re-
garded as equivalent one another and replaceable.
8. Aristotle’s words that ‘the equal bodies which move past each other
in a stadium in opposite directions, the one from the goal of the sta-
dium, the other from the middle-point with equal velocities’ in con-
junction with the above mentioned conditions necessitate us to
suppose the opposite movements of the two rows of bodies which
pass by each other at the turning-point (= the middle-point) in ques-
tion. There is no reason to believe that these two rows of equal bod-
ies should pass by each other in the middle-point in the sense which
Lee et al. understood it.
9. Concerning the details of the setting of two rows passing by each other
at the turning point (M), it may be appropriate to imagine as follows:
(1) The one row (	) which consists of and corresponds to
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a couple of Eumelus and Diomed and the other row of and  to
that of Menelaus and Antilochus.
10. It is noticeable that each of the couples consists of a set of two rivals
who respectively develop a desperate struggle between them. See for
example the case between Eumelus and Diomed: ‘The horses of the
descendant of Pheres now took the lead, and close behind (
	

) them came the Trojan stallions of Diomed. They seemed as if
about to mount Eumelus’ chariot, and he could feel their warm breath
on his back and on his broad shoulders, for their heads were close to
him as they flew over the course.’150) The speed of Diomed’s chariot
suffers nothing by comparison with one of Eumelus’. The case be-
tween Menalaus and Antilochus too is much the same.151)
11. There is no gap between two “bodies” (	
), the situation of which
can be suitably represented by two “cubes” which are closely adja-
cent to one another.
It is noteworthy that the figure 9 involves some fundamentally important
changes from Ross’ original interpretation (See Figure 10).
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Ross’ greatest weak point consists in his supposition of implicit double use
of the term “the middle.” The “middle” means on the one hand a turning-point
(); but on the other hand the middle-point (M) of the stadium. As a conse-
quence of this double use of the “middle” it became necessary for Ross to
make another unnatural supposition, i.e., to guess that the leading C too starts
to move at the middle point M, being urged by a fact that the leading B must
start ‘	’ as the above figure 10 shows.
In contrast with this weaknes, my interpretation has not only a historical
support in Homer, but also is consistent with the structure of the Greek sta-
dium. My representation of the Stadium satisfies the necessary conditions
which Greek traditional stadium must fulfil. In order to verify the case I quote
Lee’s explanation about Greek stadium. He says as follows:
‘In shape it was rectangular. Starting and finishing line were marked by a
line of stone slabs, in which are sockets for posts. These posts seem to
have been called 
(note the plural), and were temporary, hav-
ing to be renewed each time the games were held. They seem to have
been used both in the stadium-race and in the 	: in the stadium as
objectives, in the 	as an actual turning posts. In the long races all
these posts except the central one were removed, and the runners all
turned round it. There was in fact a single turning post only in the long
races.’152)
In the above figure 9 there are no inconsistent items with Lee’s above tes-
timony.
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So far we have successfully excavated the first layer of Zeno’s four para-
doxes which was covered by a large quantity of surface soil and brought many
“invisible” aspects to light. Now, we are prepared to dig up afresh the second
layer of Zeno’s arguments against motion.
Notes
1) Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Le Visible et l’Invisible suivi de notes de travail,
Gallimard, 1964, p. 300.
2) In order to convey my intention of this book I composed the following poems
all of which represent a rather straightforward visual intimation of the “invisi-
ble” meanings implied by Zeno’s “paradoxes” which may be metaphorically sum-
marized under the title of “Achilles and his Shadow.” I hope the readers will
through going reading of this book appreciate the metaphorical meanings sug-
gested previously in these poems.
3) This is an adaptation of Homer, The Iliad, XXII. 2123 making use of the last
scene of Hashire Meros! (Hurry now Meros!) by Japanese novelist Dazai Osamu.
4) This is an adaptation of Zeno’s Achilles making use of Peter Schlemiel’s The
Shadowless Man.
5) This is also another adaptation of Achilles making use of Chinese Taoist phi-
losopher Chuan-tzu’s work ‘A dialogue between the outline and the shadow’
(The Inner chapter 3). Cf. The Book of Chuang-tzu, A new, complete translation
of the classic Taoist text, translated by Martin Palmer with Elizabeth Breuilly,
Arkana Penguin Books, 1996, p. 20.
6) This is an adaptation of Zeno’s Arrow making use of The Iliad, XXII. 188292.
7) Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Le Visible et l’Invisible suivi de notes de travail,
Gallimard, 1964, p. 269.
8) When the Persians captured the Ionian cities, according to Herodotus’ sympa-
thetic report (I, 1645), the Phocaeans decided to abandon their native city and
sailed to the westward world. They explored the Adriatic Sea and the far west to
find out the prominent colonies including Messalia and Tartessos in Spain. The
Phocaeans who settled at Alalia were forced to Corsica after five years under the
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attacks of the allied Carthaginian and Etruscan and finally made a permanent
home at Velia (Elea). See L. H. Jeffery, Archaic Greece, The city-states c. 700
500 B.C., Methuen & Co. Ltd, London, 1976, p. 228; see also C. J. Emlyn-Jones,
The Ionians and Hellenism, A Study of the cultural achievement of the early
Greek inhabitants of Asia Minor, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980, pp. 22ff.
9) According to DL 28 Elea, Zeno’s native place, is a Phocaean colony, ‘once
known as Hyele,’ ‘a city of moderate size, skilled in nothing but to rear brave
men.’
10) Plato in his dialogue Parmenides 127a-c describes a meeting between
Parmenides, Zeno, and Socrates: ‘Zeno and Parmenides once came to Athens for
the Great Panathenaea. Parmenides was then well advanced in years, about
sixty-five, quite grey-haired, and of distinguished appearance, and Zeno was
nearly forty, handsome and tall. It was said he had been Parmenides’ favorite. He
said that they stayed at Pythodorus’ house in Ceramicus, outside the city walls,
and Socrates came there with a number of others, eager to hear a reading of
Zeno’s treatise, which Zeno had brought to Athens for the first time. Socrates at
the time was very young.’ Following to this description we may say that Zeno
was born about 490 B.C.
11) Cf. Plato, Phaedrus, 261d: ‘Do we not know that the Eleatic Palamedes has
such an art of speaking that the same things appear to his hearers to be alike and
unlike, one and many, stationary and in motion?’ (translation by Cornford)
Though some scholar regards Zeno’s nick-name “Eleatic Palamedes” given by
Plato as a contemptuous epithet, in reality it is not the case. Contra Cornford’s
understanding of the art of disputation	
of Zeno the “Palamedes,” R. E.
Allen aptly says: Paramedes was the Inventor, a culture-hero like Prometheus,
who gave to Greek the adjective
, “ingenious.” He is one of the peo-
ple Socrates hoped to meet in the afterlife (Apology 41b), and a symbol of wis-
dom as opposed to political power in Epistle II (311b).’ See R. E. Allen, Plato’s
Parmenides, Translated with Comment, Yale University Press, 1997, p. 77.
12) Cf. According to Plutarch’s Life of Pericles, ch. 4.3 it is said that ‘Pericles also
a student of Zeno the Eleatic, who discouraged on physics, like Parmenides, and
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who perfected a kind of skill in examining opponents in argument that brought
them to a state of aporia through opposed arguments; so Timon of Phileus
expressed it, when he spoke of the great power, that failed not in its effect, of
Zeno with the two-edged tongue, the man who laid hold upon all things.’ Cf. also
Plato, Alcibiades I, 119a; see also W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy,
Vol. II, Cambridge University Press, 1969, pp. 8081.
13) Cf. DL IX. 28.
14) Cf. DL IX. 25: ‘Aristotle says that Zeno was the inventor of dialectic, as
Empedocles was of rhetoric.’ Cf. also DL. VIII. 57: ‘	


[] 
	

 !"	"
Cf. also Sext., adv.math. VII. 6: #$
%&
	

$' $(		
)*!"	

'
)$	

15) See ‘Appendix A: Zeno’s Writings.’
16) Cf. DL IX. 26.
17) Diogenes Laertius (Cf. DL IX. 2627) says: ‘He plotted to overthrow
Nearchus the tyrant (or according to others, Diomedon) but was arrested: so
Heraclides in his epitome of Satyrus. On that occasion he was cross-examined as
to his accomplices and about the arms which was conveying to Lipara; he de-
nounced all the tyrant’s own friends, wishing to make him destitute of support-
ers. Then, saying that he had something to tell him about certain people in his
private ear, he laid hold of it with his teeth and did not let go until stabbed to
death, meeting the same fate as Aristogiton the tyrannicide. Demetrius in his
work on Men of the Same Name says that he bit off, not the ear, but the nose.
According to Antisthenes in his Successions of Philosophers, after informing
against the tyrant’s friends, he was asked by the tyrant whether there was any-
one else in the plot; whereupon he replied, “Yes, you, the curse of the city!”; and
to the bystanders he said, “I marvel at your cowardice, that, for fear of any of
those things which I am now enduring, you should be the tyrant’s slaves.” And
at last he bit off his tongue and spat it at him; and his fellow-citizens were so
worked upon that they forthwith stoned the tyrant to death. In this version of the
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story most authors nearly agree, but Hermippus says he was cast into a mortar
and beaten to death.’
18) Plato, Parmenides, 128a, translation by Cornford. We should bear a fact in mind
that an English translation “there is a One” is only an alternative between vari-
ous expressions which may convey the meanings respond to the original Greek
expression “” See R. E. Allen’s notes 5 & 6 which refers to the expres-
sion “	
” in his Plato’s Parmenides, Translated with Comment,
Revised Edition, Yale University Press, 1997, pp. 56.
19) This is a reason why there was some talk that he was a ‘double-tongued’
person.
20) See for example the description of the contemporary usage of the “paradox” in
Longman Lexicon of Contemporary English, Longman Group Ltd., 1981, p. 328.
21) They say that Philetas of Cos was tormented by the Liar Paradox and commit-
ted suicide. See note 22 R. M. Sainsbury, Paradoxes, Cambridge University
Press, Second edition, 1995, p. 1.
22) See Sainsbury’s definition of the “paradox.” Cf. R. M. Sainsbury, Paradoxes,
Cambridge University Press, Second edition, 1995, p. 1. Sainsbury says:
‘Appearances have to deceive, since the acceptable cannot lead by acceptable
steps to the unacceptable. So, generally, we have a choice: either the conclusion
is not really unacceptable, or else the starting point, or the reasoning, has some
non-obvious flaw.’
23) Cf. DL, IX, 25. Timon called Zeno and Melissus “double-tongued:” 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 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Cf. also Proclus,
Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides, Translated by Glenn R. Morrow and John M.
Dillon, Princeton University Press, 1987, 631.36632.23.
24) Cf. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Le Visible et l’Invisible suivi de notes de travail,
Gallimard, 1964, p. 269
25) 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!
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26) See Aristotle, Phys. Z. 2, 233a21.
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27) The text of the Dichotomy: 	
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28) Cf. Topics, 160b69: ‘Although even that is not enough; for we often hear argu-
ments that are contrary to common opinions, whose solution is yet difficult, e.g.
the argument of Zeno that it is impossible to move or to traverse the stadium;’
See also Aristotle, Phys. &8 263a5; Simplicius, 1013. 4 ad 239b10; 947. 5 ad
233a21; 1289. 5 ad 263a5.
29) Bekker reads '	
But I take '
following Cornford, Lee, and
Ross.
30) The text of the Achilles: 	'		'	
(!	'	
'
		
!%		



		

#	
		


	!	



'

31) Cf. A. C. Graham, Chuang-tzu, The Inner Chapters, Unwin Paperbacks, 1986,
p. 56.
32) Following Bekker’s reading '	
at 239b21 Lee retains it, whereas he
emended other '	
s of Bekker’s text to '	
However, he mis-
translated this '	
to ‘the slowest runner.’
33) The text of the Achilles (Second part): 		"!$
	
			
"	
!
	

		


 
	'	
	
	
		
"! 	

	
	

	%		
'"#	
ZENO’S FOUR PARADOXES AGAINST MOTION
― ―135
	
	

 





34) The text of the Arrow I: 
	

 
	
!"!	


!
#


!
"	$


!
"	$
%& 

	
	$&

	!	
'&

35) The text of the Arrow II:	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36) The fact may be indicative of a fact that Aristotle especially concerned about
the Arrow.
37) Reading )*+,-.#//0122#345)6
78) 9:;2<<2=-122>=2?@4AB
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39) Reeding after Lee: 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42) Cf. Simplicius’ commentary: ‘This being premised he goes on to suppose a sta-
dium DE, and four bodies of equal size AA or any number, provided it be even,
so that the number of bodies ... has a half which are stationary and are placed
so as to occupy a central stretch of the stadium.’ (translation by Lee) Thus it is
necessary that the number of the bodies is even, because all the trains have to
be divided into their halves. In this respect, as it will become clear, the Stadium
is a version of the Dichotomy.
43) Cf. N. B. Booth, ‘Zeno’s Paradoxes,’ JHS, 1957, II, p. 194.
44) Cf. G. S. Kirk, J. E. Raven and M. Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers,
Cambridge University Press, Second Edition, 1983, p. 276.
45) See Parmenides’ fragment 7. 4.
46) Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric, Vol. II, 1403a1919; also Vol. I, 1362a2021.
47) Cf. Aristotle, Topics, Vol. VIII, 163a2933.
48) Cf. Simplicius, 1289. 5; Lee, p. 49.
49) Vlastos objects to Simplicius’ view of the Dichotomy. But, I think, Simplicius
is justified.
50) Cf. Iliad, XXII, 208.
51) Cf. Simplicius, Op. cit. 	
52) Cf. Philoponus, 81. 7, Lee, p. 47.
53) W. D. Ross, Aristotle’s Physics, A Revised Text with Introduction and
Commentary, Oxford, (First edition 1936), 1960, p. 72.
54) Adolf Grunbaum, Modern Science and Zeno’s Paradoxes, London, George Allen
and Unwin Ltd, 1967., pp. 3738.
55) Following Bekker’s reading at 239b21 Lee retains it, whereas he
emended other s of Bekker’s text to However, he mis-
translated this to ‘the slowest runner.’
56) The text of the Achilles (Second part): 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58) Concerning the word-meaning “pompous’, “bombastic” of 	
%$
	%Lee prompts us to see LS(J).
59) H.D.P. Lee, Zeno of Elea, A Text, with Translation and Notes, Amsterdam,
Adolf M. Hakkert-Publisher, 1967, p. 77.
60) Cf. The Iliad, XXIII. 346.
61) W. D. Ross, Op. cit., p. 71.
62) Cf. The Iliad, XXII. 139140: '
%#%
63) Ibid: (	
!
""In the other contex, however,
Homer likens Achilles to “a hound” () and Hector to “a fawn” ().Cf.
The Iliad, XXII. 189190.
64) Cf. The Iliad, XXII. 199201: ‘And as in a dream a man availeth not to pursue
one that fleeth before him the one availeth not to flee, nor the other to pursue-
even so Achilles availed not to overtake Hector in his fleetness, neither Hector
to escape.’ (	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Translation by A. T. Murray (Loeb).
65) Cf. Proclus’ Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides, Translated by Glenn R.
Morrow and John M. Dillon, Princeton University Press, 1987, pp. xxxviii-xliii.
66) Cf. H. Tarrant, ‘More on Zeno’s Forty Logoi,’ ICS 15, pp. 2338.
67) Cf. Themistius, 199. 25.
68) Simplicius, 1013.31
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69) Saying this I have in mind Zeno’s two fragments B2 and B3 on which I shall
give a detailed explanation later.
70) R. E. Allen considers that the abstract style of Zeno’s argument does not fit the
“vivid” imagery of the arguments preserved by Aristotle. See his Plato’s
Parmenides, p. 79.
71) In his treatise ‘On What Is Not or Concerning Nature’ Gorgias the sophist de-
veloped a discourse which may be regarded as a parody or a witty reductio of
Eleatic metaphysics utilizing Eleatic logic at important points of which included
some vivid images appealing to imagination: “a man flying,” “chariots running
over the sea,” “Scylla,” and “Chimaera.” Cf. DK, B3, 79; 80.
72) Gorgias’ fragment (79): ‘	
	

	


 	

	

	 	
	’ DL B3
(79).
73) ‘
		 
!	"#
"$"


"
%


"
$"
	"
	
&'
"
()	
	"



		")	)


##%

"
"


#*
"
(Chambry, 	
Fables, Texte et Traduit, Paris, d’
edition Les Belles Lettres 1967) See also Augustana Recension 226; B. E. Perry,
Aesopica, vol. I, Urbana, 1952; Cf. B. E. Perry (Edition & Translation), Babrius
and Phaedrus, Harvard University Press (Loeb), pp. xi-xvi.
74) Ibid.
75) Cf. Aesopica 3; 26; 111; 177; 423; 428; 438; 447.
76) Cf. Plato, Phaedo 60d.
77) Cf. DL. II. 133134. See also Gert-Jan van Dijk, +,-.,/0.1.,/234.,/
Fables in Archaic, Classical, and Hellenistic Greek Literature, With a Study of
the Theory and Terminology of the Genre, Brill, 1997, pp. 344345.
78) Cf. Hideya Yamakawa, ‘The Mathematical Structure of Zeno’s Paradoxes of
Motion,’ in Hideya Yamakawa, Greek Philosophy ad the Moder World, Studies in
Greek Philosophy Series, International Center for Greek Phiosophy ad Culture,
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Ionia Publication, 1998, pp. 7374.
79) For the detailed explanation of the matter, see my paper ‘The Mathematical
Structure of Zeno’s Paradoxes of Motion,’ in the above cited book, pp. 7686.
80) See Cornford’s note 1, p. 180 in Aristotle, Physics Books V-VIII (Loeb), trans-
lated by P. H. Wicksteed & F. M. Cornford. (First published 1934) and D. Ross,
Aristotle’s Physics, A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary, Oxford,
1936, 1960, p. 658.
81) Cf. A27; H. Diels & W. Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, Sechsten
Auflage, 1964, S. 253.
82) Cf. Simplicius, 1015. 19 (Lee 30); Philoponus, 816. 30. (Lee 33).
83) Cf. Lee, Op. cit., pp. 7978.
84) Cf. W. D. Ross, Op. cit., p. 658.
85) Cf. Parmenides, Fr. B8. 16; cf. also Hideya Yamakawa, ‘Reductio ad Absurdum,
On the Origin of Indirect Proof,’ in Hideya Yamakawa, Greek Philosophy and the
Modern World, Studies in Greek Philosophy Series No. 26, The International
Center for Greek philosophy and Culture, 1998, pp. 5962.
86) Cf. Lee, p. 64 ff. Epiphanius’ reading is very similar to B4; therefore it may be
regarded as a trusty copy of Zeno’s original Arrow; On the other hand, in spite of
a fact that Sextus Empiricus in Pyrrh. Hyp. III. 71 says that ‘this argument is,
in fact, that of Diodorus Cronos’ (	


),’ because of its close resemblance to B4 and the Arrow I, we may take
it as a copy of an argument of Diodorus Kronos, who in turn took it from Zeno’s
original argument.
87) 

88) 



89) 

  !"
#"
90) 

91) 

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92) Cf. Parmenides Fr. 8, 14, especially the following expression: ‘	

	
		
’(There still remains just one account of a way, that
is.)
93) Cf. Aristotle, Phys., 233b35234a2.
94) Cf. Aristotle, Phys., 220a21.
95) Literally he says that Zeno’s conclusion that ‘the arrow in motion is at rest’
‘follows from the assumption that time is composed of a number of [indivisible]
now; for if this is not granted the conclusion cannot be inferred.’
96) Phys., 232a2325.
97) Translation by R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye in J. Barnes (ed.), The Complete
Works of Aristotle, The revised Oxford translation, Princeton University Press,
1984.
98) Cf. Phys., 233b2931.
99) Cf. also Phys., 264a34.
100) Contra F. D. Miller, Jr., ‘Aristotle against the Atomists,’ in N. Kretzmann,
Infinity and Contiuity in Ancient and Medieval Thought, Cornell University Press,
1982, p. 101. Miller there insists that: the term atomos should be taken as simply
“indivisible” and as referring to the points under fire in VI 1. Aristotle elsewhere
refers to an atomon nun, which is a pointlike instant that should not, I think, be
identified with the atomos chronos of VIII 8. For instants, like points, cannot be
successive, whereas atomic times can be.
101) Op. cit., 317a12.
102) Cf. Aristotle, De Generatione et Corruptione, 316a1516; 316b1516.
103) Cf. Andrew Pyle, Atomism and Its Critics, Problem Areas associated wit the
Development of the Atomic Theory of Matter from Democritus to Newton,
Thoemmes Press, 1995, p. 1.
104) See 	
‘Zeno’s Metrical Paradox of Extension’ in W. Salmon (ed.),
Zeno’s Paradoxes, Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis and New York, 1970.
105) Cf. Simplicius, 139.27; See Lee, p. 13.
106) Cf. DL, fr. 2; Simplicius, 139. 5.
107) Contra R. Sorabji, ‘Atoms and Time Atoms,’ in N. Kretzmann, Infinity and
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Contiuity in Ancient and Medieval Thought, Cornell University Press, 1982, pp.
5962. Cf. Sextus, Adv. Math., X 119120. We should realize that the original
idea of an atomic “present” or “now” is never remote from our everyday time-
experience.
108) We should remember that Hesiod in the Works and Days often refers to the
time limit where one ought to work hard. Impressing upon Perseus the impor-
tance of labor he preaches as follows: ‘When Zeus has finished sixty wintry days
after the solstice, then the star Arcturus leaves the holy stream of Ocean and
first rises brilliant at dusk. After him the shrilly wailing daughter of Pandion, the
swallow, appears to men when spring is just beginning. Before she comes, prune
the vines, for it is best so (Huh G. Evelyn-White, Hesiod, Works and Days, Loeb
Classical Library 57, 1936, 1995, pp. 4546). Reading this passage we can easily
visualize a figure of plowman who encourages himself and says: ‘Now it is time
to prune the vines.’ For a plowman the interval between the rising of Arcturus
and the first appearance of the swallow is nothing but a “now.” (Cf. Hesiod,
Works and Days, 176: ‘		’) Such a “now” is not indivisible. It is but a
time span which may be correlated to a number of perceptible events. However
we can imagine a situation where such an interval becomes increasingly nar-
rower and arrives eventually at a threshold wherein the difference between
events can no longer be discriminated. And such a perceptual threshold affords
us the notion of moment as a minimal and indivisible time which Jakob von
l in 	
durch die Umwelten von Tieren und Menschen called “das
kleinste unteilbare 
”: ‘Die Momente sind die kleinsten unteilbaren
Zeitgefassen, weil sie der Ausdruck von unteilbaren Elementarempfindungen,
den sogenannten Momentzeichen, sind. den Menschen , wie bereits
gesagt, die Dauer eines Momentes 1/18 Sekunde. Und zwar ist der Moment
alle Sinnesgebiete der gleiche, weil alle Sinnesempfindungen von dem gleichen
Momentzeichen begleitet werden. Achtzehen Luftschwingungen werden nicht
mehr unterscheiden, sondern als ein einheitlicher Ton Es hat sich
gezeigt, da
der Mensch 18 
die seine Haut treffen, als  
!
Druck empfindet. Die Kinematographie bietet uns die"Bewegungen
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der Auenwelt in dem uns gewohnten Tempo auf die Leinwand zu werfen. Dabei
folgen sich die einzelnen Bilder in kleinen Rucken von 1/18 Sekunden.’ (Jakob
von und Georg Kriszat,	
durch die Umwelten von Tieren und
Menschen, S. Fischer Verlag, 1970, p. 33). It is but a step from this notion of the
perceptual “now” to one of the atomic “now,” whereas there is a great disparity
between this and the Aristotelian indivisible “now.” The Aristotelian definition of
“now” is so modern and sophisticated that it is reminiscent of Dedekind’s defi-
nition of the real number. (J. W. R. Dedekind, Stetigkeit und irrationale Zahren,
1872; 2 Aufl. 1965; Mathematische Werke Bd. 2) It is very unlikely that Zeno at-
tributed such a refined theory to his opponents.
109) Barnes’ words; according to Barnes an “architectonic” structure of Zeno’s
four paradoxes is a mere product of scholars’ “neat fantasy.” Jonathan Barnes,
The Presocratic Philosophers, Routledge & Kegan Paul, The revised edition in one
volume, 1986, p. 285.
110) Cf. Op. cit., p. 291.
111) Cf. Paul Feyerabend, Against Method, Revised Edition, Verso, 1988. Literally
he says that ‘the consistency condition which demands that new hypotheses
agree with accepted theories is unreasonable because it preserves the older the-
ory, and not the better theory. Hypotheses contradicting well-confirmed theories
give us evidence that cannot be obtained in any other way.’ p. 5.
112) Patricia Curd, The Legacy of Parmenides, Eleatic Monism and Later Presocratic
Thought, Princeton University Press, 1998, p. 179.
113) Cf. Aristotle, Physics, 231b1820.
114) Op. cit., 219a1213.
115) Cf. Aristotle, Physics, Books V-VIII, Loeb Classical Library, p. 180.
116) Cf. Bertrand Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World, George Allen &
Unwin Ltd., 1938, p. 179.
117) This principle underlies the ‘	

	’ as I have insisted.
118) Cf. the above quoted Phys., Z9, 239: ‘o’	
		
’ 
119) Cf. the above Sextus Empiricus: ‘
	
	’ I think, this phrase
reflects Zenonean genuine expression; cf. Parmenides B8. 2630: ‘But change-
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less within the limits of great bonds it exists without beginning or ceasing, ... re-
maining the same and in the same place it lies on its own (	

) and thus fixed it will remain.’
120) This shows that it is not the case that Zeno did not argue the counterpart of
motion (that is, rest)..
121) This negates the possibility of the above mentioned (4) ‘The same arrow is
and is not in motion at the same time.’ Hegelians or Marxists may appeal to this
possibility; but Zeno rejects it. Zeno succeeded to Parmenidean law of the ex-
cluded middle: ‘

		



’ (B8.
1516).
122) Parmenidean disjunction is a strong one; A or B, and not the case that A and
B at the same time; in modern notation: (A∨B)∧¬(A∧B). A is contradictory
to B, i.e., tertium non datur. Thus, it is the case that ‘(A→¬B)∧(¬B→A)’
and so that A≡¬B; that is, the opposition between A and B is nothing but one
between A and ¬A. Indeed, in fragment 8. 16 the goddess declares: 


(is or is not); so the major premise of the disjunctive syllogism of
Parmenides originally the following: A∨¬A; and the minor premise is given by
a reduction ad absurdum argument: ‘¬A leads to an absurdity (or¬A results in
an impossibility), therefore not ¬A.’ Then, given the major premise and the
minor premise, A is concluded as follows: 1. A∨¬A, 2. (¬A→Contradiction)
→¬¬A, 3. ¬¬A, therefore A. For the detail of Parmenidean reduction argu-
ment see my paper ‘Reductio ad absurdum, on the Origin of Indirect Proof,’ in
Hideya Yamakawa, Greek philosophy and the Modern World, International Center
for Greek Philosophy and Culture, Ionia Publication, 1998, pp. 5372.
123) Cf. W. D. Ross, Op. cit., p. 74.
124) Plato, Parmenides, 166c: ‘If Unity is not, the others will not be either one or
many. Neither will they appear one or many, for Unity, if it does not exist, cannot
seem to be present to anything or be conceived by anything. And since the oth-
ers cannot appear or be conceived to be one, they cannot appear or be conceived
to be one, they cannot appear or be conceived to be many. It follows that they can
have no other characters. In sum: if Unity is not, nothing is.’ (Translation by R.
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E. Allen; See R. E. Allen, Plato’s Parmenides, Translated with Comment, Revised
edition, Yale University Press, 1997, p. 338.)
125) Cf. Liddell and Scott, Greek-English Lexicon, 9th edition, Oxford, 1940,
(Reprinted 1966)
126) Cf. Cornford insisted that the target of Zeno’s attack was Pythagorean
“number-atomism.” See F. M. Cornford, Plato and Parmenides, Kegan Paul,
1939, Chap. 3 ‘Zeno and Pythagorean atomism.’
127) Cf. R. K. Gaye, ‘On Aristotle, Phys. Z, IX, 239b33240a18,’ J. Phil. (1908),
pp. 95116.
128) But, if the fourth argument is Zeno’s genuine one, it is unlikely that only this
is irrelevant to the race, because all of the other paradoxes, the Dichotomy, the
Achilles and Tortoise, and the Arrow, can be considered to have their relevance
to some kind of races in the stadium; that is to say, the Dichotomy and the
Achilles to the footrace and the Arrow to the archery contest.
129) Cf. W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, Vol. II, Cambridge
University Press, 1969, p. 96.
130) Cf. Hsi Yu Chi.
131) Cf. Lee, op. cit., p. 59.
132) Cf. Lee, op. cit., p. 98.
133) Cf. fr., 8. 6.
134) Cf. fr., 8. 22.
135) Cf. fr., 8. 26.
136) Cf. Plato, Parmenides, 128b-e.
137) See Rafael Ferber, Zenon’s Paradoxien der Bewegung und die Struktur von
Raum und Zeit, 2., durch gesehene und um ein Nachwort erweiterte Auflage,
Franz Steiner Verlag Stuttgart, 1995, S. 119. It is very significant that R. Ferber
too paid attention to Parmenides’ “	
” However, his reference to
 is self-contradictory in the framework of his own interpretation of the
Stadium. Witty though his idea is, his hypothesis on “	
” cannot get along
with his interpretation of the Stadium. Ferber regards each of the 	
as a
spherical object like a golf ball or a foot ball. Of course, It is not so unsuitable
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 
idea to imagine the as something like ball; see Homeros, Od., 6. 100.
Then, is it divisible or indivisible? If it were divisible, it could not have any intrin-
sic relevance to Parmenides’ “what is,” because “	
” is par excellence
“indivisible” (		
). But if it were indivisible, then its atomic property
will damage his interpretation of the Stadium. In reality he rejects explicitly the
atomic interpretation of the Stadium. Criticizing Mansfeld’s view of the Stadium
he says as follows: ‘Mansfeld’s Interpretation besteht nun darin, dass die Massen
der beiden Reihen diskrete  sind. ... Beim Stadium lauft dieses
Argument aber auf neue Formulierung der 	


der Bewegung hinaus,
kombiniert mit der Hypothese, dass die Massen Atome sind. Aber die Hypothese
der Unteilbarkeit der Massen ist schon lange widerlegt, und die der
Bewegung schon im Agument vom Pfeil akzeptiert worden.’ See, Rafael Ferber,
Op. cit., pp. 115116. To tell the truth, thein plural have no significant role
within the framework of Ferber’s interpretation of the Stadium. They are irrele-
vant to the essential argument of the Stadium. In addition, it matters little
whether they move towards the opposite direction or not. In any way, they are,
according to Ferber, products fabricated by Aristotle.
138) Parmenides, Fr. 8. 25.
139) Democritus wrote a work titled with ‘On a difference of opinion, or on the con-
tact of a circle and a sphere which was, according to Heath in A History of Greek
Mathematics, Vol. I From Thales to Euclid, Oxford, 1921 (First edit.), 1965, pp.
178179, in which he retorted Protagoras who attacked geometry in his book
	(On mathematics) saying that: ‘A material circle does not in
actual fact touch a ruler at one point only.’ The fact obviously shows that among
Protagoras’ contemporary mathematicians the topic of the contact of a circle or
sphere with its tangent was a well-known problem. Plato in the Seventh Letter
spoke of the circles that are drawn I geometric exercises or are turned on the
lathe and declared that each one of them is everywhere in contact with the
straight, in order to defend his own theory of Forms (See Seventh Letter, 343a);
cf. A. Wedberg, Plato’s Philosophy of Mathematics, Almqvist & Wiksell,
Stockholm, 1955, p. 57; cf. also Aristotle, Metaphysics, B. 2. 998a3; cf. also W. D.
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Ross, Aristotle’s Metaphysics, A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary,
Vol. I, Oxford, 1924 (First edit.), 1958, p. 232. By the way, it is an interesting
fact that we read a Zenonian paradox concerning the ‘Millet Seed’ in Simplicius’
comment to Aristotle, Phys. H5. 250a19 (1108. 18) which preserves a dialogue
between Zeno and Protagoras which runs as follows: ‘By this means he solves
the conundrum which Zeno the Eleatic asked Protagoras the sophist. “Tell me,
Protagoras,” he said, “does a single grain of millet or the ten thousandth part of
a grain make any sound when it falls?” And when Protagoras said it did not,
“Then”, asked Zeno, “does a bushel of millet make any sound when it falls or
not?” Protagoras answered that it did, whereupon Zeno replied, “But surely
there is some ratio between a bushel of millet and a single grain or even the ten
thousandth part of a grain”; and when this was admitted, “But then surely”, Zeno
said, “the ratios of the corresponding sounds to each other will be the same: for
as the bodies which make the sounds are to one another, so will the sounds be
to one another. And if this is so, and if the bushel of millet makes a sound, then
the single grain of millet and the ten thousandth part of a grain will make a
sound.” This was the way Zeno used to put his questions.’ (translation by Lee)
In spite of Diogenes Laertius (III. 48) some said that Zeno was the first to write
dialogues, it is unlikely that he was an author of this dialogue in which he himself
the leading character. Therefore it is provably sure that the above quoted dia-
logue was written by others who had some interests with the relationship be-
tween Zeno and Protagoras. Protagoras (born in Abdera not later than 490 B. C.
and probably died soon after 421 B. C.) and Zeno (born about 490 B. C.) were
contemporaries so that it was quite possible that they had met. And this means
that Zeno had through knowledge of the problem of the contact of a circle or
sphere with its tangent.
140) See Parmenides, frag. 8, 2225: ‘Nor is it divided, since it all exists alike; nor
is it more here and less there, which would prevent it from holding together, but
it is all full of being. So it is all continuous: for what is draws near to what is
(	
).’ The last word ‘	
’ should be inter-
preted as an expression of the continuity of the what is.
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141) Cf. Lee, Op. cit., p. 86.
142) Cf. Lee, Op. cit., p. 86.
143) Cf. Lee, Op. cit., p. 87.
144) Cf. Rafael Ferber, Zenons Paradoxien der Bewegung und die Struktur von Raum
und Zeit, 2., durchgesehene und um ein Nachwort erweiterte Auflage, Franz
Steiner Verlag Stuttgart, 1995, pp. 2326; pp. 114118.
145) Cf. Rafael Ferber, Op. cit., p. 30.
146) Cf. Rafael Ferber, Op. cit., p. 3.
147) Cf. Rafael Ferber, Op. cit., p. 24.
148) Cf. Ross, Op. cit., pp. 663664.
149) Cf. XXIII, 495498.
150) Cf. XXIII, 375382.
151) Cf. XXIII, 417441.
152) Cf. Lee, Op. cit., pp. 8788.
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SUMMARY OF ‘ZENO’S FOUR
PARADOXES AGAINST MOTION’
Hideya YAMAKAWA
Notifying my intention in the study of Zeno’s four paradoxes to be continued
in a long series, I would like to convey my true motive. I have no interest in
dealing with Zeno’s discourse qua “puzzle.” And much less I intend to issue
some new and unexplored “solutions” of Zeno’s discourses qua “puzzles.”
which might be appreciated only by a small circle of specialists.
My original intention is to show a fact that something “invisible” lurks behind
the “visible” surface of Zeno’s discourses. Zeno’s “paradoxes” as “visible”
strata are pregnant of the “invisible” meaning. However, the “invisible” mean-
ing in question is not separated from its “visible” layer. The “visible” thing it-
self assumes the meaning of the “invisible.” Thus, the “invisible” is a secret
counterpart of the “visible.”
The subject-matter Zeno called into question and indeed Zeno himself hide be-
hind the “visible” surface qua “puzzle.” Therefore, in order to excavate Zeno’s
“invisible” figure and bring it to light successfully, we must remove a large
quantity of surface soil which has covered Zeno’s true identity. Thus breaking
through the bulky layers of “paradoxes,” we have, by all means, to get to the
solid rock of Zeno’s thought.
Thus, in this paper ‘Zeno’s Four Paradoxes against Motion’ I shall begin to
show my provisional outlook of Zeno’s paradoxes and then proceed to digging
up the first layer of Zeno’s paradoxes, which a large quantity of surface soil qua
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“puzzles” has covered. Thus I hope that I could show you some invisible and
hidden dimensions of Zeno’s paradoxes, which had gone unnoticed for a long
time.
